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viewing this technology as a resource for honest parties rather than adversaries, it may enhance not only
the security, but also the performance of specific cryptographic schemes. While considerable effort has been
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measures fulfilling the practical requirements of cryptographic primitives, which are equally essential for
classic and quantum ones. This survey aims to draw greater attention to the importance of physical security,
with a focus on secure key generation and storage as well as secure execution. More specifically, the possibility
of performing side-channel analysis in the quantumworld is discussed and compared to attacks launched in the
classic world. Besides, proposals for quantum random number generation and quantum physically unclonable
functions are compared to their classic counterparts and further analyzed to give a better understanding of
their features, advantages, and shortcomings. Finally, seen from these three perspectives, this survey provides
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1 INTRODUCTION
The omnipresence of computers, computing platforms, and services has been shaping the way
that we handle various tasks ranging from simple switching to weather forecasting performed by
controllers in modern appliances and supercomputers, respectively. For the latter purposes, it is
widely accepted that several computational problems are fundamentally hard, even for modern
machines with state-of-the-art computational power and resources. With the development of
quantum physics, it is claimed that further computational power can be gained through describing
the behavior of systems at a higher level of granularity (i.e., atomic and subatomic levels), where
classical physics fails [Maslov et al. 2018]. Since the introduction of this idea, it has been doubted
whether a practically feasible computational machine operating on quantum principles can be
built [Dyakonov 2019; Ladd et al. 2010]. In spite of all criticisms, the efforts to realize quantum
computers have been made progressively, but an admittedly considerable breakthrough was re-
cently reported in [Arute et al. 2019; Moore, Samuel K. 2019]. Interestingly enough, it has been
demonstrated that their proposed processor, named “Sycamore”, comprised of fast, high-fidelity
quantum logic gates can perform a computational task in 200 seconds, which would take the world’s
fastest supercomputer 10,000 years to finish.
Perhaps the most drastic consequence of this technological advancement is that now, one of the
main challenges in the realization of attacks on some of the cryptographical schemes could be dealt
with. More specifically, for more than two decades, it has been thought that the quantum computers
required to run Grover’s and Shor’s algorithms - which can break the security of symmetric
and public-key cryptography, respectively [Grover 1996; Shor 1999]- could not be practically
achievable [Schneier 2018]. The Sycamore processor can be seen, of course, as a first step towards
building powerful quantum computers, which can compromise the security of cryptographic
protocols applied in our every-day life. Besides these protocols, other crucial questions to ask would
be: in the face of quantum-enabled attacks, which physical primitives remain secure. In fact, while
the impact of the quantum computing paradigm on various cryptographic protocols and primitives
has been intensely studied, its effect on physical security is less well understood. Physical security
concerns developing measures to meet the needs of cryptographic primitives in practice. More
concretely, such measures should be in place to narrow the gap between the characteristics of a
cryptographic primitive implemented in reality and what is assumed about that cf. [Maes 2013].
For these physical measures, referred to as “Root-of-Trust” (ROT), in the face of attacks becoming
feasible in the post-quantum era, the physical-security assessment should be revisited. Particularly,
the following objectives are essential for such an evaluation (see Figure 1).
Secure key generation: True random number generators (TRNGs) are one of the most well-
acknowledged and promising candidates introduced to harvest random numbers from physical
sources of randomness. Albeit being trusted to generate random numbers with high quality (i.e.,
being uniformly distributed), there are difficulties in implementing such generators. One is how one
should examine whether the generator exhibits the desired uniformity, which has been addressed
by introducing the notion of “adversarially controlled sources of randomness” in the literature.
In the classic world, this issue has been well studied; however, in a quantum world, more effort
must be put into tackling this problem. More precisely, we are interested in procedures, which
can guarantee that the bits produced by the generator are close to being indistinguishable from
uniform bits from the point of view of a quantum adversary.
Secure key generation and storage using physically unclonable functions (PUFs): The
premise underlying the concept of PUFs is that they can generate unpredictable and instance-
specific random numbers to offer physically secure key generation and storage. In the classic world,
after the introduction of the first PUF, it has become evident that PUFs are vulnerable to a wide
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Fig. 1. The tree-of-trust built on a root-of-trust (RoT). RoT plays an important role in fulfilling the objectives of
physical security. These objectives include secure key generation and storage as well as secure execution, i.e.,
(ideally) eliminating certain physical side-channels [Maes 2013]. Some examples of RoTs are PUFs, TRNGs, and
side-channel-resistant schemes. Note that side-channels can be leaked at different levels of the tree-of-trust,
e.g., interpreter-level side-channels and timing side-channel leaked from a client and an algorithm in software,
respectively [Verbauwhede and Schaumont 2007]. Nevertheless, in this survey, we are interested in physical
side-channels.
range of attacks covering physical, invasive attacks to non-invasive machine learning (ML) attacks.
Several countermeasures, from structural to protocol level, have been proposed to increase the
security of PUFs against various types of attacks. Nevertheless, when assessing the security of
these proposals, the main question to ask is that if they could remain secure in a quantum world.
In this regard, not only should new PUFs be designed and implemented, but also threat models and
risk assessments of possible attacks have to be considered carefully.
Secure execution:Nowadays, it is widely accepted that in the classic world, the general assumption
about the secure execution of cryptographic implementations has been refuted by mounting
numerous attacks. This has initiated a new line of research with the aim of enhancing the design of
circuits to minimize side-channel leakages. This direction should be further pursued to investigate
how mathematical algorithms employed in the side-channel analysis, and in particular, their
computational complexity would evolve in a quantum world. This is indeed a crucial step to provide
a better understanding of the attacker’s capabilities in the post-quantum era.
So far, we mainly emphasize how an adversary equipped with quantum technology can com-
promise the security of physical primitives and RoTs. It is equally important to understand how
this technology can enhance security by accomplishing tasks that cannot be performed in the
classic world. In this case, quantum computers are not our main focus, but quantum devices, in
particular, RoTs that take advantage of enhanced properties offered by quantum physics. In other
words, providing the same functionality as their classical counterparts, quantum-enhanced RoTs
should exhibit better features, e.g., security or efficiency. One popular example of such RoTs is
quantum random number generation through key expansion, made possible in the quantum world
(see, Section 4 for more details). The implementation of quantum-enhanced RoTs gains pace thanks
to various innovative products that should rely on the security of these primitives.
A brief overview and the organization of the paper: By drawing attention to the positive side
and negative side of the quantum technology for physical security, this survey investigates the
state-of-the-art techniques proposed in the literature. Before giving an overview of the content
of each section, we stress that the goal of our survey covers neither an inclusive list of all studies
in quantum cryptosystem nor the detailed design of systems developed to enhance the physical
security in both of the classic and quantum world. Yet, our survey aims at examining the research
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landscape in physical security and strengthening research in this direction. In this regard, it forms
the basis for a systematic and comprehensive study on specific aspects of physical security in the
quantum era, namely secure key generation and storage as well as secure execution. For excellent
surveys covering a broader spectrum of research areas related to cyber-security and quantum
cryptosystems, we refer the reader to [Mosca 2018; Nejatollahi et al. 2019; Wallden and Kashefi
2019], just to name a few.
In our survey, after discussing how cryptography has been leveraging the advantages of quantum
technology in Section 2, Sections 5–3 describes the recent developments in physical security and
RoTs. In each of these sections, a taxonomy is proposed, which reflects the nature of existing
methods in terms of how quantum technology enables us to either enhance or assess the security.
In the latter case, we primarily look into attacks that can be launched thanks to the progress made
in quantum technology. Finally, Section 6 expands on lessons learned and future directions in this
area of research.
2 QUANTUM COMPUTING FOR CRYPTOGRAPHY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
As briefly discussed in Section 1, even carefully-chosen cryptosystems devised for day-to-day appli-
cations in the classic world could be susceptible to attacks, which become feasible in the quantum
world. These attacks can be seen as immediate consequences of the development of quantum
computers with more computational power than their classical counterparts. The advantages of
quantum technology are, however, not limited to this since it can be applied to equip honest parties1
with quantum-enhance devices to obtain significant improvement in comparison to a classical
setting. This section deals with the effects that quantum technologies have on the design of such
devices as well as attacks against cryptosystems.
2.1 Quantum Computing against Classical Schemes
The practicality of our most common cryptographic schemes, i.e., RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and Elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC), relies on the difficulty of two problems: the factoring problem and
the discrete logarithm problem [Li et al. 2016]. While factoring and discrete logarithms are not in
themselves interesting problems, they have been found to be crucial for public-key cryptography.
This application, in turn, remains sufficiently secure as far as the mathematical problems underlying
their design remain difficult. In other words, the computational-power requirements of established
cryptographic algorithms prevent attackers from stealing our data and allowing the security of
public-key systems and privacy of transactions for all. However, it is known that the advent of
certain quantum algorithms has theoretically transformed the exponential time complexity of these
cryptographic schemes; hence, they cannot be assumed secure in the quantum world.
Notable quantum algorithms, which cause these security concerns, are Shor’s algorithm and
Grover’s algorithm [Grover 1996; Shor 1999]. Shor found a clever way to factor numbers in
O((logN )3), and Grover enhanced a brute force search in a database with N entries such that
it takes
√
N operations. Thus, Shor’s algorithm weakens RSA, Diffie-Hellman, ECC, and any
cryptosystem that relies on the aforementioned factoring and discrete-log problems, while Grover’s
algorithm greatly improves the attackers’ efficiency in tasks such as password cracking, see Figure 2.
Therefore, the design of cryptographic schemes that rely on the factoring and discrete logarithm
problems should be revisited.
There are, however, protocols that remain “quantum-proof” such as lattice-based cryptography,
code-based cryptography, and multivariate cryptography [Campagna et al. 2015; Chen et al. 2016;
1In this survey, as usually mentioned in cryptography-related literature, we refer to users and attackers as honest and
malicious parties, respectively.
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Fig. 2. Taxonomy of post quantum-cryptographic schemes. While quantum computation offers advantages in
several useful applications, it can be misused by adversaries attempting to break the security of cryptographic
primitives. In this regard, compared with the best classical computers, quantum computers facilitate running
algorithms and conducting analysis, e.g., side-channel analysis.
Perlner and Cooper 2009]. In order to fully enjoy the advantages associated with these protocols,
huge obstacles to making them practical solutions should be overcome. First and foremost, the
adversary model in the realm of post-quantum cryptography should be well defined. The fact that
adversaries might benefit from quantum technology, even in the future, makes it impossible to
neglect the importance of defining precise adversary models [Hsu, Jeremy 2019]. The second issue
is related to determining the level of security that we expect from a cryptosystem. This level can be
further translated to the key length, the time required to compromise the security of this key, and
the time needed to implement a system to offer this level of security [Mosca 2018]. Last but not
least, in line with the latter problem, post-quantum cryptographic schemes should be developed
that achieve high efficiency and security simultaneously, see, e.g., [National Institute of Standards
and Technology 2019]. The next section is devoted to this matter.
2.2 Benefits ofQuantum Computing for Cryptography
The danger of quantum computing is much publicly advertised; however, quantum technology
is not simply restricted to methods of attacks. The quantum technology has two further useful
properties in the context of cryptography: truly random processes and tamper-evident states. This
positive side of this technology can be traced back to the introduction of two-state quantum systems,
whose quantum states can be seen as the quantum superposition of two independent, physically
distinguishable quantum states [Leighton and Sands 1965]. This behavior of quantum states has
been validated experimentally, e.g., in the Stern and Gerlach experiment performed in 1922, which
explained the quantum property of spin in an electron [Gerlach and Stern 1922]. The existence of
such two-state systems has an important implication as they can also be seen as qubits, the basic
unit of data generated using quantum technology. It must be noted that though a qubit may exist in
a combination of states, yet after measurement, it results in any one of the two possible outcomes.
This result remains unchanged even after repeated measurements as long as the procedure of
measurement remains unchanged.
This should not be confused with the concept of “entanglement” referring to a particle with
individual states that cannot be defined independently, i.e., depending on the state of other particles-
even if being spread far apart [Leighton and Sands 1965]. This means that measurements on the
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state of one entangled particle affect the state of all of its entangled particles. Interestingly enough,
this characteristic has found applications in quantum cryptography, particularly quantum key
distribution. More concretely, in 1984, Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard theorized a way of
information-theoretically secure communication in a quantum system [Bennett and Brassard 1984].
Their protocol, called BB84, has proposed a quantum key distribution (QKD), where one can create
a key from qubits and transmit it to another user.
Such a quantum key has some important properties: first, it is harvested from a truly random
source because of the randomness inherent in the measurement of unpolarized qubits along an axis.
Secondly, if an eavesdropper attempts to read a quantum key, the interaction with the key’s state
is guaranteed to cause noticeable change, therefore providing verification that the key is secure –
something which is proven mathematically (a corollary of the no-cloning theorem [Wootters and
Zurek 1982]), and is not possible in classical computing.
Let us consider this protocol as an example of how quantum-enhanced cryptosystems can be
realized in practice, thereby making the following observations. First, implementation of such a
QKD system suffers from a stability problem – qubits by nature are very unstable. Hence, if the
system is not robust enough, it cannot be said with certainty whether a change in state was due to
eavesdropping or system instability. This issue has been studied and resolved (to some extent), see,
e.g., [Asaad et al. 2020], resulting in further advancement in quantum cryptosystems [Dowling and
Milburn 2003; Wallden and Kashefi 2019]. Second, similar to various other types of cryptosystems, a
QKD relies on the quality of the randomness source, from which the keys are extracted. Validation
of this assumption is absolutely vital; otherwise, keys used in such a system can be prone to
attacks (e.g., guessing). As a prime example of this, the security and applicability of a cryptosystem
presented in [Di Falco et al. 2019] has been questioned, partly due to the randomness source
suggested in that study [Hsu, Jeremy 2020]. Therefore, an important goal for future research is
to sharpen our understanding of the conditions that ensure adequate security so that quantum
cryptosystems can achieve a high level of reliability and security. In this respect, it is critical
that the objectives of physical security are also achieved for such cryptosystems, e.g., quantum
bit commitment, quantum coin-flipping, quantum fingerprints, quantum data hiding, quantum
authentication, and encryption. These applications share some commonalities: (1) for them, the
quantum technology has inherent advantages over classical protocols, and (2) they may need secure
key generation and storage as well as secure execution. The next sections (Section 5-3) describe
methods and apparatus developed for this purpose.
3 QUANTUM COMPUTING FOR SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS
Side-channel attacks (SCA) have been a prominent method of extracting sensitive data from
cryptographic elements of the chip in the classic world. Such attacks exploit physical vulnerabilities
in the hardware implementation rather than flaws of the mathematical structure of the algorithm.
Compared to cryptographic attacks, which are modeled as black-box attacks, adversaries during
SCA have access to the “grey” box [Li et al. 2016], in which internal physical quantities are observed
and analyzed for the key extraction [Li et al. 2016]. Side-channel is performed in two steps. Firstly,
physical leakage of each query performed on cryptographic implementation needs to be turned
into probability and score vectors [Standaert 2010]. This information is valuable because further
key extraction can be performed. The second step is to sort information and search over every
individual key until the entire key is completed and extracted [Standaert 2010; Taha and Eisenbarth
2015]. The more complex or noisy the leaky data is, the more difficult the side-channel attack
becomes to perform [Standaert 2010].
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Fig. 3. Comparison between side-channel attacks on (a) classical cryptographic algorithms, (b) post-quantum
cryptographic algorithms. Adversary (Eve) needs to be able to control the circuit and has access to the inputs
and data leakage. In (a) classical cryptographic algorithms dependency between the secret key and input
data is more apparent, compared to (b) post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, in which adversary must
put additional effort into finding the key-dependent data needed for SCA analysis.
3.1 SCA in Classic World
SCA and its countermeasures belong to a mature field, which has been investigated for more
than twenty years [Li et al. 2016]. A high-level overview of SCA has been reported in [Fan and
Verbauwhede 2012]. Further, numerous literature overviews of side-channel attacks have been
reported over the years, such as [Fan and Verbauwhede 2012; Le et al. 2008; Li et al. 2016; Narain
et al. 2014; Spreitzer et al. 2017]. SCAs are mainly separated into two categories based on the type
of exploited information: physical and logical. Physical attacks obtain information found from
physical features of the device [Fan and Verbauwhede 2012], such as power consumption and
electromagnetic emissions. In contrast, logical attacks gain information from running software
properties, such as data-usage statistics [Fan and Verbauwhede 2012], and data footprint, which
can be exploited through cold boot attacks [Villanueva-Polanco 2019] (see, Figure 1).
This survey will focus on physical side-channel attacks, which can be categorized into invasive,
semi-invasive, and non-invasive attacks, as shown in Figure 4. The invasive side-channel attack
destroys the physical packaging of the integrated circuit while maintaining functionality, and it
cannot be returned to its original state. Semi-invasive attacks require backside decapsulation, in
which attacker can perform photonic analysis [Tajik et al. 2017b], optical contactless probing [Tajik
et al. 2017a] or laser stimulation [Lohrke et al. 2018]. Finally, by performing non-invasive attacks,
the attacker only observes specific physical parameters produced while the system is running,
without affecting the IC packing. As discussed in the last section, such attacks can be active or
passive.
The most abundant attacks reported are non-invasive attacks. While there have been “exotic”
means of executing this attack, by using acoustics [Deepa et al. 2013], [Narain et al. 2014], [Gupta
et al. 2016] or light [Spreitzer 2014] to produce useful data, the most versatile parameters to exploit
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Fig. 4. Side Channel Taxonomy in classical and quantum computing settings. Physical side channel attacks
performed on classical algorithms are shown in blue, and attacks on quantum-resistant algorithms are shown
in orange, as well as the attacks by the quantum algorithms
the security of the chip are timing, power consumption, and electromagnetic (EM) emissions [Narain
et al. 2014]. Power Analysis (PA) is a pioneering method in SCA, and most of the techniques used
to analyze power emission data can be applied to data collected through EM. The taxonomy in
Figure 4 also shows the categorization of these attacks into profiled and non-profiled attacks [Le
et al. 2008]. Profiling attacks, which model the device implementation, through either analysis
of a large number of signals from a reference device in an SCA attack called Template attack, or
through the pre-defined noise model with pre-defined function, as in Stochastic attack [Le et al.
2008], or Linear Regression attack [Fu et al. 2017]. Non-profiling attacks such as Partitioning PA,
Differential PA, Simple PA, and Correlation PA [Le et al. 2008], do not rely on modeling a reference
device. The main building blocks of the attacks mentioned above are illustrated in Figure 3. As
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depicted in this figure, SCAs performed in classic and quantum worlds share various similarities;
however, due to their differences in nature, SCA in the quantum world should be considered in
further detail, as explained below.
3.2 SCA inQuantumWorld
While the development and design of SCA and countermeasures against SCA on pre-quantum
classical algorithms have been the most explored in this field, SCAs in the quantum world have
been researched on two fronts. Firstly, side-channel attacks in the quantum world became a point of
interest for many researchers after the 2016 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
call for post-quantum algorithms resistant to quantum computer attacks. Their susceptibility to
side-channel attacks has been investigated due to the development of quantum algorithms. Another
front is using the runtime and space usage advantages of quantum algorithm speed-up from
quantum computers, [Montanaro 2016], to launch side-channel attacks on classical computation.
The following sections will provide a detailed overview of post-quantum algorithms, which will be
followed by side-channel attacks on them.
3.2.1 Post-quantum Cryptographic Algorithms. Today’s core cryptosystems, including public-key
encryption, digital signatures, and key exchange, are mainly based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange,
RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adleman) public-key cryptosystem, DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) and
elliptic curve cryptosystems [Alagic et al. 2019]. Since the development of quantum algorithms
provide at least quadratic speed-up of computation, and at most exponential speed-up, RSA, DSA,
and elliptic curve cryptosystems will no longer be secure after the creation of large size quantum
computer [Alagic et al. 2019]. However, symmetric encryption and hash functions will remain
safe in the post-quantum era because exponential speed-ups for quantum search algorithms are
not achievable against them [Alagic et al. 2019]. The algorithms most promising against quantum
computing are based on the lattice, code, hash, and multivariate public key problems. These
algorithms will be introduced below.
Lattice-based algorithms are considered promising due to their security under worst-case hard-
ness assumptions and their simple construction. They are based on the shortest vector problem
(SVP) in the lattice, as well as ring learning with error (R-LWE) problem, which is believed to be
reducible to SVP, an NP-hard problem. Examples of Lattice-based algorithms are NTRU, BLISS,
ring-TESLA, the GLP, and LAC [Bindel et al. 2016; D’Anvers et al. 2019; Espitau et al. 2017], which
are based on ring learning with errors (R-LWE), the ring short integer solution (R-SIS), and the
decisional compact knapsack (DCK) problem [Bindel et al. 2016]. The original NTRU algorithm,
consisting of algorithms NTRUSign and NTRUEncrypt, turned out to be susceptible to various
attacks [Espitau et al. 2017], but its variation NTRU Prime is still a candidate in the second round
of NIST standardization. Another lattice-based algorithm based on the Mersenne Low Hamming
Combination Assumption, which involves error-correcting code, is Ramstake scheme [D’Anvers
et al. 2019].
NTRU operations are based on truncated polynomial rings. Compared to the original NTRU,
which consists of three stages (key generation, encryption, and decryption), there are two mecha-
nisms for encryption in NTRU Prime: Streamlined NTRU Prime and NTRU LPRime, where latter
one shares similarities with R-LWE schemes. NTRU Prime is exploited through the leakage in poly-
nomial multiplication of private key and known ciphertext in the product scanning method [Huang
et al. 2020]. The original version of the NTRU algorithm was proven to be insecure because of the
vulnerabilities exploited from the use of hash functions in encryption/decryption phases.
Learning with errors based algorithms, e.g., FRODO, and R-LWE NewHope algorithms, have been
attacked by differential power analysis. These attacks rely on a mathematically hard problem where
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the goal is to distinguish between a uniformly random sample from learning with error samples.
Algorithm BLISS, which partially depends on R-LWE, has been exploited through electromagnetic
emission analysis [Bindel et al. 2016] and fault injection attack [Espitau et al. 2017]. In addition to
BLISS, ring-TESLA and the GLP have also been attacked by fault injection [Espitau et al. 2017]. LAC
algorithm is attacked by a timing attack in [D’Anvers et al. 2019]. In [Aysu et al. 2018], in algorithms,
FRODO and NewHope intermediate values of matrix and polynomial multiplications depend on
the sub-keys. Intermediate values in polynomial multiplication in NewHope depend on the same
coefficients of the secret polynomial, while in FRODO, intermediate values in matrix multiplication
depend on the values from the secret matrix. BLISS, ring-TESLA, and GLP contain an important
step of rejection sampling, which creates a distribution of created signatures independent of the
secret key. All three algorithms share the following flow: firstly, the secret key and other variables
are sampled and manipulated into the public key. The plaintext is hashed with the public key, either
directly, or requires additional manipulation. The signature created consists of two polynomials.
Rejection sampling is applied by compressing one polynomial, creating a signature independent
of the secret key. In the decryption phase, the size of compressed and uncompressed polynomials
is checked if they are equal, as well as the equality of the un-hashed value of polynomials and
ciphertext.
LAC algorithm consists of a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and public-key encryption
(PKE). PKE consists of key generation algorithm, decryption, and encryption. In KEM, the key is
created by expanding seed into a polynomial, which is uniformly and randomly sampled from a
pseudo-random generator. Error correction capabilities of this scheme depend on the deterministic
derivation of error-correcting values from the uniform and random seed. Ramstake algorithm
depends on Mersenne prime numbers, which do not increase Hamming Weight when modulo
operations are performed on them.
Code-based McEliece scheme, which has not been mathematically broken since its introduction
in the 1970s, is based on the hardness of decoding a random linear error-correcting code, such as
Syndrome Decoding, known to be NP-hard [Singh 2019]. It requires a large key size, and it has been
primarily used in encryption. Multiple optimized McEliece schemes have been demonstrated with
the primary goal of achieving faster encryption [Seho Myung et al. 2005], such as quasi-cyclic low-
and moderate- density parity code (QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC, respectively) in the McEliece scheme.
Its difficulty is based on the Syndrome Decoding problem and the Goppa Codes Distinguishing
problem.
In classical McEliece, the private key is created from a parity check matrix, “scrambling” matrix,
and permutation matrix. Encryption is done by adding a vector of errors to the manipulated
plaintext. The first step of decryption is the creation of codeword, which is done by multiplying the
ciphertext and permutation matrix. Then, further decryption is done by the Patterson algorithm,
which computes the syndrome of the codeword. The syndrome is created by multiplying codeword
with the transpose of the parity check matrix. Multiplication is done in two steps. Firstly, the
syndrome is initialized as a vector of zeros. Then, the algorithm iterates through codewords. For
ith entry of codeword with of value of 1, ith row of transposed parity check matrix is added to
syndrome vector. The next step is to transform the syndrome vector into the syndrome polynomial.
Patterson algorithm for that operation uses an algorithm that finds roots in polynomial and Extended
Euclidean Algorithm (XGCD). Finally, the plaintext is obtained by multiplying syndrome with
"scrambling" matrix, and by solving the key equation.
In QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC McEliece, the private key does not contain a permutation matrix,
but it contains matrix Q created of a small number of 1s in every row. A code like this does not
have an algebraic structure. With the sparse parity check matrix, error correction in decryption
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is efficient [Misoczki et al. 2013]. During the decryption phase in QC McEliece, the bit-flipping
algorithm is used to create syndrome by computing the number of unsatisfied parity-check equations
associated with every bit of parity-check matrix. Each bit that is involved in the number of equations
greater than the threshold is flipped recomputing the syndrome, which gets recomputed until
syndrome becomes zero. However, if in implemented design, the algorithm stops after a certain
number of iteration, decoding failure happens.
Hash-based algorithms are used for digital signatures, and their security relies on the security
of their associated hash function and/or binary hash tree structure [Kannwischer et al. 2018]. A
binary hash tree structure combines multiple one-time signature key pairs, and it can be stateful or
stateless, depending on if the secret key gets updated or not after the signing. XMSS is a stateful
digital signature scheme that is being standardized [Kannwischer et al. 2018]. During the key
generation of XMSS and tree generation, the public key is created from the seed coming from a
PRNG. The signature is performed using W-OTS+ signature scheme. Compared to XMSS, SPHINCS
is a stateless scheme, which in addition to W-OTS+, also uses HORST signature schemes. Signatures
are pseudo-randomly selected to sign the message [Kannwischer et al. 2018]. Side-channel attacks
on hash-based post-quantum algorithms are rarely performed, compared to lattice- and code-based
schemes, but work in [Kannwischer et al. 2018] and [Castelnovi et al. 2018] proposed DPA and
fault injection side-channel attacks, respectively.
Multivariate Public Key Crypto-algorithms (MPKC) rely on the NP-hard mathematical prob-
lem of solving a set of multivariate quadratic polynomial equations in a finite field. Various MPKC
schemes have been proposed, but the most promising ones which are shown to be the fastest come
from the step-wise triangular system family [Yi and Li 2017]: Rainbow, UOV, Tame Transformation
Signature (TTS) and its enhanced version enTTS. Digital signature scheme enTTS is believed to
be the fastest, which works with 20-byte hashes and 28-byte signatures in GF(28), as reported
in [Yi and Li 2017]. The main building blocks of enTTS are secret multivariate polynomials of
small size and linear maps. Most coefficients are zero, in which monomials do not occur twice. The
central linear map consists of three layers [Czypek 2012]. The hashed message needs to go through
the computation of affine transformations (matrix-vector multiplications and vector additions),
evaluation of polynomials (element multiplications), and solving of a system of linear equations [Yi
and Li 2017], to generate a signature of enTTS.
3.2.2 SCA on Post-quantum Cryptographic Schemes. As shown in Table 1, side-channel attacks
in the quantum world are non-invasive attacks, and they exploit power leakage, electromagnetic
emissions, and timing leakages. Fault analysis (FA) attack launched in the quantum world has
been shown as both passive and active attack, in which an attacker actively changes and observes
the behavior of the system, or just passively observes. Power analysis (PA) side-channel attacks
launched in the quantum world are differential PA, correlation PA, and simple PA.
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is a statistical attack which analyzes measured power con-
sumption from traces of cryptographic algorithm implementation. Attacked traces are intermediate
values that are manipulated in a way that they can be expressed as a function of the secret key and
known value. The attacker often uses Hamming Weight (HW) or Hamming Distance (HD) model
to predict power consumption. HD models leakage as switching bits, while HW models leakage
based on the number of bits in measured data. The attackers use a statistical tool to compute the
correlation between predictions and the acquired power consumption traces. DPA vulnerabilities
of the post-quantum crypto schemes are discussed below, and they are summarized in Table 1.
• Code-based algorithms: DPA usually attacks an intermediate value, which is a function of known
data and secret key. This dependency is not straightforward in the classical McEliece scheme.
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Table 1. Summary of physical attacks on post-quantum cryptographic algorithms (PQCA), where TA is
Timing Attack, FA is Fault Analysis, PA is Power Analysis, SPA is Simple PA, DPA is Differential PA, CPA is
Correlation PA, OTA is Online Template Attack and EMA is Electromagnetic Emissions Analysis
PQCA Type of SCA Reference Degree of Success
McEliece
TA
[Strenzke et al. 2008] Theoretical analysis of attack on degree of error lo-
cator polynomial.
[Strenzke 2010] Theoretical analysis of secret permutation which de-
crease cost in brute force secret key recovery and
proof of concept implementation.
[Shoufan et al. 2010] Experimental ciphertext recovery.
[Avanzi et al. 2011] Improved theoretical analysis of [Strenzke et al.
2008].
[Strenzke 2013] Experimentally recovered secret information: zero-
element, linear and cubic equations.
FA [Cayrel and Dusart 2010] Theoretical analysis of fault injection sensitivity.
SPA
[Heyse et al. 2010] First analysis of experimental Goppa polynomials re-
covery required for secret key extraction from 8-bit
AVR microprocessor.
[Molter et al. 2011] Experimental ciphertext recovery from FPGAXGCD
algorithm implementation.
[von Maurich and Güneysu
2014]
Experimental 80-bit private key and secret message
recovery from STM32F4 Discovery Board and Atmel
AVR XMEGA-A1 Xplained Board implementations.
[Richmond et al. 2015] Experimental analysis of matrix multiplication im-
plemented on ARM Cortex-M3 which is required for
permutation matrix recovery in syndrome computa-
tion.
DPA [Petrvalsky et al. 2016] Experimental recovery of 64 by 64 permutation ma-
trix from the ARM Cortex-M3.
QC-LDPC/MDPC
TA [Santini et al. 2019] Theoretical model of partial key recovery.[Eaton et al. 2018] Theoretical and experimental analysis of key recov-
ery which does not depend on decoding failure rate
using 220 samples for 80-bit key, 223 samples for 128-
bit key and 25 for 256-bit key.
DPA
[Chen et al. 2015] Experimental full key recovery from FPGA imple-
mentation presented at Design, Automation and Test
in Europe Conference 2014.
[Rossi et al. 2017] Experimental partial key recovery from ChipWhis-
perer evaluation platform followed by entire key re-
covery computed by solving the system of noisy bi-
nary linear equations.
[Sim et al. 2019] Experimental full key recovery from 32-bit proces-
sor eliminating need for solving linear equations
from [Rossi et al. 2017].
SPA [Fabsic et al. 2016] Theoretical full key recovery analysis.[Sim et al. 2019] Experimental full key recovery from 32-bit proces-
sor breaking the countermeasure proposed by [Rossi
et al. 2017].
Lattice-Based Algorithm
NTRU Prime CPA
[Huang et al. 2019] Theoretical and practical analysis of polynomial
multiplication needed for full key recovery imple-
mented on STM32F303RCT7 32-bit microcontroller.
[Huang et al. 2020] Experimental secret key recovery from the poly-
nomial multiplication from Cortex-M4 implementa-
tions.
OTA [Huang et al. 2020] Experimental recovery of full private key from the
Cortex-M4 board implementation.
NTRUEncrypt TA [Silverman and Whyte 2006] Theoretical and experimental analysis of partial se-
cret key recovery.
NewHope,
FRODO SPA
[Park and Han 2016] Experimental full secret key recovery from R-LWE-
based schemes implemented on 8-bit microcon-
troller.
DPA [Aysu et al. 2018] Experimental full secret key recovery from
SAKURA-G FPGA Board implementation with 99%
success rate.
LAC TA [D’Anvers et al. 2019] Experimental analysis of full secret key recovery un-
der 2 minutes using less than 216 queries.
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – Continued from previous page
PQCA Type of SCA Reference Degree of Success
BLISS EMA [Espitau et al. 2017] Experimental full secret key recovery on embedded8-bit AVR implementation.
FA [Bindel et al. 2016] Theoretical fault sensitivity analysis of implemented
algorithm.
ring-TESLA, GLP FA [Bindel et al. 2016] Theoretical fault sensitivity analysis of implemented
algorithms.
Ramstake TA [D’Anvers et al. 2019] Experimental full secret key recovery under 2 min-
utes using approximately 2400 decryption queries.
Hash-Based Algorithm
SPHINCS
DPA [Kannwischer et al. 2018] Theoretical partial secret key recovery from simu-
lated implementation.
FA [Castelnovi et al. 2018] Theoretical partial secret key recovery frommultiplecompelled signatures
[Genêt et al. 2018] Experimental analysis of theoretical attack from
[Castelnovi et al. 2018] implemented on Atmel ARM-
based SAM3X8E with over 30% success probability
from 64 forgery attempts.
XMSS DPA [Kannwischer et al. 2018] Unsuccessful theoretical key recovery.
MPKC-Based Algorithm
UOV, Rainbow FA [Hashimoto 2013] Theoretical analysis of partial key recovery.CPA [Park et al. 2018] Experimental full secret key recovery from 8-bit AVR
microcontroller with help of algebraic key recovery
attack.
TTS FA [Hashimoto 2013] Theoretical analysis of partial key recovery.
enTTS DPA, FA [Yi and Li 2017] Theoretical analysis of partial key recovery from
naive Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC)
implementation.
The syndrome was thought to be the variable needed to be attacked, but ciphertext only directs
how the syndrome is computed for the parity check matrix and does not contain the ciphertext in
it. DPA attack on code-based scheme classical McEliece from [Petrvalsky et al. 2016] is launched
on bit permutation of ciphertext. HW model is applied to individual bits of leakage model. Cor-
relation analysis must be performed for each input bit. The permutation matrix gets recovered
by comparing known ciphertext and permuted ciphertext to correlation peaks from each mea-
surement. One measurement corresponds to one row of the permutation matrix. However, in QC
McEliece schemes, DPA is performed on syndrome computation, because the parity matrix is
sparse, containing the same information in each row rotated one bit each row, [Chen et al. 2015].
DPA methodology on constant-time multiplication [Sim et al. 2019], which forms syndrome,
consists of splitting the attack position into two parts, word rotation and bit rotation, which
computes different parts of the parity matrix. Constant-time masked multiplication has been
implemented as a countermeasure against timing attacks. However, this countermeasure is
vulnerable against DPA in private syndrome computation. Prior to [Sim et al. 2019], attacks failed
to recover the entire key because constant-time multiplication software implementation results
were saved in the same register, creating numerous candidates for secret indices. Further, the
system of linear equations had to be solved, such as in [Rossi et al. 2017], whose complexity
increases with the number of possible candidates. However, the attack in [Sim et al. 2019] proposed
multiple and single trace attacks to overcome the need for solving linear equations, as stated in
Table 1. If the process provides single-bit shift instructions, a single trace attack is sufficient by
recognizing left shift instruction, while for multiple bit shift instructions, multiple track attack is
performed to recover correct secret indices from a numerous number of possible candidates.
Multiple-trace DPA methodology consists of splitting the attack position into two parts. In the
first part, masking is performed with all ones or all zeroes. In this step, the power consumption at
each point is modeled as a sum of data-dependent power and Gaussian noise power. Modeling
the data-dependent power consumption with HW, there is a linear relationship between total
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power consumption and HW modeled value. Using the Pearson correlation coefficient between
these two parameters, the first part of the correct indices can be recovered. In the second part,
the CPA is performed to find the rest of the correct indices by bit rotation.
• MPKC algorithms: DPA on MPKC recovers the secret affine map by targeting matrix-vector
product, such as in Rainbow and UOV schemes in [Park et al. 2018]. The hurdle present in this
attack is that neither intermediate values nor the vector which multiplies secret affine maps
are known. However, if the scheme is implemented with a specific key structure [Park et al.
2018], CPA can be performed to extract the values of the secret affine map. [Park et al. 2018]
has launched the attack on 8-bit AVR microcontroller, recovering full secret key, see Table 1.
DPA attack on enTTS algorithm requires help from fault analysis, to perform the DPA attack
correctly. [Yi and Li 2017] analyzed a DPA attack on enTTS by executing algorithm several times
implemented on Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC), with different inputs and getting
a set of power consumption traces from affine transformations and central map with multivariate
polynomials. While the algorithm is executing, sensitive variables are manipulated by fault attack,
which changes the random values to fixed values. This sensitive variable is related to the secret
key and known variable. Making a hypothesis about the secret key, the attacker can predict the
sensitive value and corresponding leakage. Correlation analysis is then performed between the
predicted value and measured power. To map hypothetical sensitive values to corresponding
leakages, the Hamming Distance model is used because enTTS is implemented on CMOS.
• Lattice-based algorithms: CPA on lattice-based algorithm NTRU Prime in [Huang et al. 2019]
concentrates on multiplication of ciphertext and private key in the decryption phase. It considers
HW of intermediate value to be expected power consumption. The correlation analysis algorithm
processes all HW polynomials and the corresponding measured power values with respect to the
user-set correlation threshold. The candidate is determined from all optimal guesses, with the
largest absolute value of the correlation coefficient. The attack recovers full key from polynomial
multiplication from the NTRU Prime implemented on the 32-bit microcontroller, [Huang et al.
2019], see Table 1. Intermediate states of matrix-polynomial multiplication also depend heavily
on the same subkey, in other lattice-based algorithms, such as FRODO and NewHope. The main
limitation of applying DPA on lattice-based algorithms is the frequency of false positives because
similar outputs are created for similar sub-keys. To mitigate this issue, the attacker observes
intermediate results and key bit by bit. According to to [Aysu et al. 2018], because of modular
reductions in the process, only one bit will have a high correlation. This attack in [Aysu et al.
2018] forms an ensemble of possible keys.
• Hash-based algorithms: Power analysis attack on hash-based algorithms requires a function which
depends on the secret key and known value, to be found. Then, the function is called twice, during
the key and signature generations. A limited number of function calls is the reason for a few SCA
on hash-based algorithms being reported. Measurement is filled with noise, and in both function
calls, a value known to the attacker is the same. The ideal case occurs when the hash function
and PRNG do not leak any information, which is not entirely accurate in practice [Kannwischer
et al. 2018]. Another difference is that the one-time signature is called multiple times during the
authentication path, giving attackers a greater possibility to attack the scheme. In practice, the
attacker is not powerful enough to arbitrarily choose the leakage function and change it during
every signature and key creation, so authentication path leakage gets reduced to the leakage of a
single, one-time signature scheme OTS. DPA has been analyzed on the SPHINCS algorithm, as
reported in Table 1, while the same attack is not successful against the XMSS algorithm.
Comparison to classic world algorithms: DPA against AES consists of attacking each round of AES
and using the recovered secret as a known variable in the next round, [Jaffe 2007]. Compared to
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any of the attacks on post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, this attack is straightforward and
does not require a search for a function that depends both on sub-key and value known to the
attacker. In the classic world, various multi-bit statistical tools are used in final key recovery, while
in the post-quantum world, correlation analysis seems only to be used, thus reducing DPA to CPA.
Simple Power Analysis (SPA): Simple power analysis (SPA) visually analyzes power traces
measured over time. Such attack exploits key and data dependencies during the computation. It can
also be successful against recognizing certain operations within the algorithm since each operation
has its own power signature [Heyse et al. 2010]. SPA can only be used when the signal-to-noise
(SNR) ratio is small; otherwise, DPA would be a better choice. SPA on post-quantum cryptographic
algorithms is reported on code and lattice-based schemes.
• Code-based algorithms: SPA performed on classical McEliece has been able to extract permutation
and parity-check matrices. If these operations are computed individually, then matrices are
successfully recovered. However, if these two are combined in computation, they are recovered
combined as well [Heyse et al. 2010]. The HW of permuted ciphertext and original ciphertext is
the same because only the location of the ciphertext gets permuted. Permutation matrix can be
recovered if the attacker only considers ciphertext with HW equal to 1. The attacker has also been
able to visually recognize when the summation is performed [Heyse et al. 2010; Richmond et al.
2015]. SPA attack also recovers an error vector, which is added to encoded plaintext. The attacker
needs to have access to the Euclidean algorithm to recognize the error locator polynomial, [Molter
et al. 2011]. The decryption of chosen ciphertext, and measuring power traces, the attacker is able
to recover the error vector from power peaks which correspond to Euclidean algorithm iteration
numbers, see Table 1.
• Lattice-based algorithms: SPA on R-LWE based cryptographic scheme attack the decryption phase
by visually inspecting if the modular addition is larger than the modulus [Park and Han 2016]. In
the first step of the SPA on R-LWE, the ciphertext is chosen. Then decryption is performed on the
chosen ciphertext. The next step is to recognize if the modular addition is executed, and if it is, the
secret key can be recovered. SPA has been performed on NewHope and FRODO, experimentally
recovering entire secret key with a high success rate, as noted in Table 1.
Comparison to classic world algorithms: SPA in the classic world is dangerous, having even been
successful against RSA (by recovering a private bit from the square-and-multiply algorithm) and
against KeeLog. Compared to the classic world, the post-quantum world does not have easily
distinguishable functions, especially considering that entirematrices need to be recovered, compared
to keystream in the classic world.
Electromagnetic Emission Attacks (EMA): Techniques used in electromagnetic emission anal-
ysis are the same as the ones used in power analysis. The only difference in attack is how data is
acquired, as the measurement setup is different. The main challenge is to recognize the possible
data leakage. In the post-quantum cryptographic algorithm, the EMA attack has been launched
on the lattice-based algorithm BLISS recovering the full secret key from embedded 8-bit AVR
implementation; see Table 1. The source of leakage in this algorithm is in the rejection sampling
algorithm during the signature generation [Espitau et al. 2017]. The attacker is assumed to know
the absolute norm of integer of interest. The rejection sampling step leaks the relative norm of
the secret key. The rejection sampling is important to achieve correct output distribution, and
its construction is very similar to the square-and-multiply algorithm, which allows for visual
inspection of bits through Single EMA (SEMA) [Espitau et al. 2017].
Timing Attacks (TA): Timing attacks (TA) are a type of side-channel attack in which the attacker
exploits the time required for the completion of a logical operation. The time required for operation
execution can also differ within the operation itself, based on the inputs being processed. Timing
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attacks in the post-quantum world have been successfully launched on code-based and lattice-based
algorithms.
• Code-based algorithms: The attack in [Strenzke et al. 2008] is the first timing attack on theMcEliece
algorithm without any countermeasures exploiting the time needed for decryption execution
and learning the dependence of errors in decoding algorithm and error locator polynomial.
The attack is further extended and analyzed in [Strenzke 2010], where the private key in the
Patterson algorithm is attacked by exploiting the time required to solve the key equation. It is
accomplished by attacking private key in the Patterson algorithm, where error locator polynomial
is related to the secret, and the time needed to solve the key equation leaks information about used
polynomials. However, this attack was shown to be impractical in [Strenzke 2013]. The timing
attack in [Strenzke 2013] takes advantage of the multiplication of syndrome with a scrambling
matrix, more specifically of syndrome inversion. [Strenzke 2013] expands on work in [Strenzke
2010] by using the leakage from syndrome inversion, together with the leakage in solving the
key equation, creating a practical attack that recovers secret information: zero-element, linear
and cubic equations, see Table 1.
Timing attacks against optimized versions of McEliece algorithm, QC-MDPC, and QC-LDPC, are
proposed in [Eaton et al. 2018; Santini et al. 2019]. In [Eaton et al. 2018], the parts of the key are
recovered by exploiting the decryption failure rate and measuring the number of iterations in the
decryption phase. Average decryption time to correct errors varies, and [Eaton et al. 2018] shows
the correlation between errors and key.
• Lattice-based algorithms: A timing attack has been reported on lattice-based algorithms, specifi-
cally R-LWE schemes. In this attack, [D’Anvers et al. 2019], decryption errors are detected and
exploited prior to being corrected. Because constant-time error-correcting schemes are not easily
implemented, decryption takes different time for codewords, which those that contain and those
that do not contain errors.
Comparison to classic World Algorithms: Timing attacks in quantum settings are significantly
underdeveloped compared to numerous timing attacks in the classic world. Compromising the
error correction also exists in the classic world, which is only one of the numerous techniques
reported. Another difference is that countermeasures in the classic world are developed to the
extent of questioning the practicality of timing attacks, while in post-quantum world timing attacks
are still very strong, considering error-correction time varies [D’Anvers et al. 2019].
Fault Attacks (FA): Errors in computation can be intentional or unintentional. Unintentional
errors can occur due to poor quality of the component, fuzzy noise, or external natural effects,
such as space radiation for systems launched into space. Chip designers take these possible errors
into account when designing the chip. However, faults, which are intentionally introduced, can
be a powerful attack pattern. The attacker makes the system behave incorrectly while observing
the behavior, comparing it with correct behavior, and reverse engineering sensitive secret data.
Fault injection attacks have been investigated in post-quantum cryptographic world on code-based
algorithms in [Cayrel and Dusart 2010], lattice-based algorithm in [Bindel et al. 2016], MPKC
algorithm in [Hashimoto 2013], and hash-based algorithm in [Castelnovi et al. 2018], as reported in
Table 1.
• Code-based algorithms: According to [Cayrel and Dusart 2010] McEliece scheme is intrinsically
resistant against fault injection attacks because of underlying error correction code. Theoretical
fault analysis in [Cayrel andDusart 2010] focuses on achieving denial of service by the introduction
of random fault on one bit in two different parameters encoding the plaintext: addition of errors
and multiplication with the public key. The third option evaluated is corrupting a plaintext. They
show that only if the plaintext is corrupted, denial of service will be triggered, while for other
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cases underlying error correction code will correct the corruption. However, optimized QC-LDPC
and QC-MDPC McEliece schemes are more sensitive to fault injection attacks because, in the
sparse matrices, the faulty random bit gets re-used multiple times, greatly diffusing the fault.
• MPKC algorithms: Fault attacks on MPKC algorithms change the unknown coefficients of polyno-
mials in the central quadratic map. For step-wise triangular systems, such as enTTS, the attacker
can recover part of secret affine transformation directly by owning a message and signature, which
is computed with a central map containing faults. In practice, this attack does not always succeed,
because central quadratic map contains three parameters, two secret affine transformations, and
central map [Hashimoto 2013].
• Hash-based algorithms: The first fault injection attack on hash-based algorithms was proposed
in [Castelnovi et al. 2018] against SPHINCS. The attack is performed in two steps: faulting and
grafting. To execute this attack, the same message is signed twice, but the fault provoked in the
second signing gives a different signature than the first. The grafting step is an analysis of two
messages, in which parts of the secret key from one-time-signature (OTS) are recovered. The
attacker grafts a tree of signatures from correct SPHINCS to the tree of signatures created from
faulty OTS. This attack has been experimentally launched in [Castelnovi et al. 2018] successfully
recovering secret key with a probability of 30%, as noted in Table 1.
Comparison to classic world algorithms: Fault injection attacks in the classic world have received
considerable investigation and can be classified into non-invasive and semi-invasive attacks, which
require sample preparation and physically injecting faults into the system, through bombarding
it with radiation or light. In post-quantum settings, all proposed attacks are still on the software
level, as many algorithms are not implemented on a physical system. It can also be interesting to
observe that these attacks have been primarily launched on classical cryptographic schemes, as
shown in Fig. 5.
3.2.3 SCA by Quantum Computer on Classical Algorithms. After the development of Shor’s al-
gorithm over twenty years ago, which provides exponential computational speed-up, theoretical
quantum algorithms have been greatly investigated [Alagic et al. 2019]. Proposed algorithms are
based on problems considered hard by computational complexity theory [Montanaro 2016]. They
have been reviewed by [Montanaro 2016], [Mosca 2008] and reported by NIST [Alagic et al. 2019].
It is hard to imagine the range of all applications of quantum algorithms and what spheres of lives
would be improved with exponentially sped-up computations. However, in terms of side-channel
attacks and privacy issues, the computer science problem of unstructured search [Montanaro
2016] has the most highlights. According to to [Montanaro 2016], the unstructured search is a
problem which evaluates function f (x) and searches for x , if a solution exists, without any prior
knowledge of the function. This is classified as NP-hard complexity problem [Montanaro 2016] and
in the worst-case scenario solution is found after 2n function evaluations. The Quantum algorithm,
Grover’s algorithm, solves the problem in
√
2n number of iterations, providing quadratic speed-up
compared to existing classical algorithms. Several works use quantum algorithms to perform brute
force attack and advance classical crypto-analytics [Martin et al. 2018c], but there is only one work,
the best to our knowledge, which uses Grover’s quantum algorithm to investigate side-channel
attacks performed by quantum computer [Martin et al. 2018c], even though side-channel leakage is
considered as a quite structured set of data.
As discussed earlier, the side-channel attack consists of two steps. Firstly, data is obtained, which
is processed into optimal sub-key candidates. Then, the search over those values is performed to
find the most likely candidates for the construction of the entire private key. According to to [Martin
et al. 2018c], the first step of side-channel attack remains the same, once quantum algorithms are
implemented on quantum computers, because there are no benefits from quantum speed-up on
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Fig. 5. Differences and similarities in taxonomy of side channel attacks in quantum and classical computing.
the processing of already low complex data unless the attack is performed with few queries and
collects large amounts of data, which is unlikely, even in hash-based algorithms. The second step,
however, which analyzes data and search for possible keys, can benefit from quantum speed-up.
The issue is that side-channel leakage data is highly structured [Martin et al. 2018c] data, while
Grover’s algorithm operates on unstructured data [Montanaro 2016]. According to [Martin et al.
2018c], this issue had already been investigated, in which Grover’s algorithm, in addition to ordered
data, also takes an advice distribution for the set. An additional issue is that data obtained through
a side-channel attack is independent, and it is not sorted and ordered as Grover’s needs.
Work in [Martin et al. 2018c] presents a novel version of the previous works in which the need
to sort data in order of likelihood of finding a solution is considered, and that distribution advice
is provided. This analysis is theoretical. Assuming that attacker has quantum RAM, the attacker
can achieve quantum speed-up with a similar assessment of the time complexity. Attack [Martin
et al. 2018c] is recognized to be limited because it uses the principles of the classic world and
applies them to quantum settings. However, this work puts the roots in a new research direction.
Regarding quantum search, rank estimation has also been researched, and [Martin et al. 2018b]
shows provable poly-logarithmic time- and space- complexity. However, the same group that
originally used Grover’s algorithm to improve SCA [Martin et al. 2018c] has been working on
improving original concept, and in [David and Wool 2019], they draw the parallel between rank
estimation and key enumeration techniques, which open doors for further research which should
focus on optimizing the algorithm, so it does not have to sort an entire set of candidates prior to
executing Grover’s algorithm [Martin et al. 2018b].
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Fig. 6. (Inspired by [Bayon et al. 2016; Herrero-Collantes and Garcia-Escartin 2017]) Typical modules included
in the design of a TRNG and QRNG. As shown in this schematic, for TRNGs and QRNGs, the main building
blocks comprising the general architecture can be considered similar. More specifically, even if not mentioned
explicitly for TRNGs, measurement of the random, physical variable should be carried out before applying the
randomness extractors. Post-processing is usually applied to improve the randomness while the embedded
test is added by the designer in some cases. In addition to running a randomness extraction algorithm, this
step can be taken to buffer and accumulate samples before outputting the random strings and/or to test
whether the generator is working properly cf. [Schindler and Killmann 2002].
4 RANDOM NUMBER GENERATORS
One of the most important requirements for virtually all keyed cryptographic primitives is the
existence of a random, unique, unpredictable key. TRNGs2 play a crucial role in implementing
practical schemes. Among such schemes, ones designed to ensure the physical security include,
e.g., anti-side-channel masking schemes [Prouff and Rivain 2013; Shamir 1979], secure entity
authentication protocols [Van Herrewege et al. 2012], and intellectual property (IP) protection [Guin
et al. 2016; Rangarajan et al. 2020; Roy et al. 2008], just to name a few. TRNGs have considered
promising candidates for generating keys due to their specific characteristics, including non-
reprehensibility, and uniqueness (i.e., being instance-specific). However, these somewhat “black-
box” assumptions about the security of TRNGs have been shown not to be valid in practice. More
precisely, their information security is reduced to physical security, which is indeed broken by
attacks mounted at a physical level, cf. [Maes 2013].
On the other hand, quantum counterparts of TRNGs, so-called quantum random number genera-
tors (QRNGs), have been advancing and becoming a well-established quantum technology with
some provable assurances. In general, QRNGs can be seen as a special type of TRNG, in which
quantum mechanical effects contribute to producing random numbers. Applications of QRNGs
range from simulation to cryptography, and interestingly enough, commercial QRNGs have been
offered since 2014, to the best of our knowledge cf. [Abellan and Pruneri 2018; Herrero-Collantes
and Garcia-Escartin 2017]. Regardless of their applications, similar to TRNGs, QRNGs must attain
reliability3 as their failure can expand the attack surface embodying QRNGs. For instance, the BB84
quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is vulnerable to attacks reported in the literature [Bouda
et al. 2012; Li et al. 2015]. This section covers such attacks and discusses how they could be a threat
even in the post-quantum era.
2Note that the scope of this paper does not cover the concept of algorithmic, cryptographically secure pseudorandom
number generators, e.g., [Blum and Micali 1984].
3This should not be confused with the reliability of PUFs discussed in Section 5. Here, the reliability of TRNGs and QRNGs
reflects the fact that they should be robust against tolerances in their components/environments.
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4.1 TRNGs: Designs and Physical Attacks
Generally speaking, it is expected that the output bits of a TRNG are uncorrelated and unbiased.
This is indeed possible only in an ideal scenario, where the bias is handled carefully through, e.g., a
randomness extractor, and TRNG is not susceptible to external influences. As these requirements
cannot be (easily) fulfilled in practice, the output of a TRNG can often be predicted through bit-by-
bit deduction attacks. To overcome this failure, the designers attempt to come up with architectures,
whose outputs can be predicted only with a negligible probability. Nevertheless, it does not hold if
the output of the TRNGs is, even to some extent, under the control of an adversary. For this purpose,
the adversary can induce variations in the setting of the TRNG, including, e.g., manipulating input
and/or output bits (e.g., introducing spikes in the power supply), emitting electromagnetic signals,
changing the temperature outside the spec’s operational range, etc. As described below, the common
design of TRNGs may not resist against such attacks.
Typically, the general architecture of a TRNG is composed of two main modules, namely a source
of randomness and a randomness extractor. Here our main focus is on physical TRNGs, built on
the basis of physical phenomena, with the most prominent examples including noise-based [Petrie
and Connelly 2000] and free-running oscillators [Kohlbrenner and Gaj 2004]. This general architec-
ture is usually implemented in a system along with a post-processing block (algorithmic and/ or
cryptographic) and, possibly, an embedded testing one, see, Figure 6. Obviously, these modules
and blocks can be vulnerable to various types of attacks falling into two categories: invasive and
non-invasive ones. In this context, being invasive means that the attack is powerful and usually
can have a permanent effect on a circuit, e.g., through inserting a pin, burning a hole, etc. [Sunar
et al. 2006]. In our survey, if not mentioned otherwise, we review non-invasive attacks, where a
TRNG is under attack temporarily, primarily, to introduce bias into its outputs.
From another point of view, an attack can be categorized into passive and active attacks. In
the former, the side channels such as the power consumption, execution time, or electromagnetic
emanations are considered, which can be helpful to obtain some information regarding the internal
functionality of the TRNG, e.g., frequencies, location, sampling frequency, etc. Passive attacks can
target the randomness extractor, and the output of the system, before or after the post-processing
model [Bayon et al. 2016]. In this regard, the adversary may monitor the side-channel leakages to
gather information, which can be further useful to predict the unseen bits generated by the TRNG,
and/or mounting active attacks more effectively. As a prime example, passive temperature attacks
can be considered [Cao et al. 2016a; Martin et al. 2014], which significantly lowers the security level
even of highly protected crypto-core implementations that are connected to the TRNG through
reducing the entropy (i.e., introducing biased). The second category includes active attacks with
the goal of disrupting the random number generation process, which are more prominent. To the
best of our knowledge, one of the first active attacks has been reported in [Šimka and Komenského
2006], where by changing the temperature of the FPGA embodying a TRNG, the bias in its output
is administered.
This line of research has further investigated frequency injection attacks against a security-
dedicated Integrated Circuit (IC) embodying a two-ring oscillator (RO) based TRNG [Markettos
and Moore 2009]. It has been shown that when the power signal is manipulated by injecting a sine
wave into that, the operating conditions of the two ROs can be modified, and consequently, the
output of the TRNG is biased. This attack has been carried out on several different TRNGs working
based on the jitter of the microcontroller’s built-in RC oscillator [Hlaváč et al. 2010], Self-Time
Ring (STR) [Cherkaoui et al. 2013a,b], Transition Effect Ring Oscillator (TERO) [Varchola and
Drutarovsky 2010], reported in [Buchovecká and Hlaváč 2013; Cao et al. 2016a; Martin et al. 2014],
respectively (see Table 2 for more examples).
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Table 2. Summary of some of physical attacks on TRNGs
Reference Type of TRNG Type of fault injected
[Mesgarzadeh and
Alvandpour 2005]
ROs in general (not on TRNGs specifically) Frequency locking of the oscillators
[Bochard et al. 2010] RO-based Manipulating the voltage supply
[Soucarros et al. 2011] RO-based Temperature variation
[Martin et al. 2014] STR [Cherkaoui et al. 2013b] Clock glitches
[Madau et al. 2018] Delay Chain True Random Number Genera-
tor [Rozic et al. 2015] (RO-based)
Pulsed electromagnetic fault
[Osuka et al. 2018] RO-based Sinusoidal electromagnetic waves injection from a dis-
tance via power or communication cables attached to
the target device embodying the TRNG
[Martin et al. 2018a] RO-based [Wold and Tan 2008] and
STR [Cherkaoui et al. 2013b]
Ionizing radiation
[Mahmoud and Sto-
jilović 2019]
STR [Cherkaoui et al. 2013b] Voltage drops induced remotely
The research in this direction has been continued by studies, which investigate the impact of
injecting electromagnetic (EM) signals into TRNGs. The effectiveness of such an attack has been
recognized in [Schmidt and Hutter 2007], followed by studies enjoying the special features of
this attack, namely being applicable through the package, and in particular, from the front-side
cf. [Ordas et al. 2015]. The authors of [Bayon et al. 2012] have launched such an attack on the
RO-based TRNG.
The main message to convey here is that on top of the vulnerability to the attacks mentioned
above, TRNGs exhibit shortcomings such as a limited generation rate and being unpredictable, rather
than truly random. As mentioned earlier, QRNGs introduced to tackle some of these problems;
however, the question remains open whether they can stand against attacks similar to one discussed
in the section. The next two sections expand on these points.
4.2 Defense:Quantum Random Number Generators
Here we briefly introduce two main classes of randomness sources widely used for QRNGs, namely
optical and non-optical sources4. Moreover, we discuss certified QRNGs, and randomness extractors
applied in the context of QRNGs, see Figure 8.
4.2.1 Optical Randomness Sources for QRNGs. Several parameters of the quantum states of light
feature inherent randomness, and therefore, optical sources have been widely adopted to design
QRNGs, see Table 3. These QRNGs are based on the premise that the quantum level of an optical
field can be explained in terms of photons. Generating and detecting uncorrelated single photons
is, therefore, the goal of various technologies, including single-photon detectors [Dixon et al.
2008; Fürst et al. 2010; Jennewein et al. 2000], silicon detectors [Ghioni et al. 2007], superconduct-
ing nanowire single-photon detectors [Hadfield 2009; Marsili et al. 2013]. Nonetheless, some of
the shortcomings of single-photon detectors are their limited capabilities to count the photons,
infeasibility due to the high cost, and long dead-time [Herrero-Collantes and Garcia-Escartin 2017].
The latter problem is not specific to single-photon detectors, but other optical QRNGs could
also suffer from that, e.g., branching path-based generators equipped with two detectors located in
different positions, where upon receiving a photon in any of these detectors, a bit can be generated
cf. [Jennewein et al. 2000; Rarity et al. 1994]. For these systems, the long dead-time results in a
low generation rate and high correlation among successive bits. On top of this, the mismatch
between the detection efficiency of the detectors as well as the non-optimal coupling ratios of the
4Note that this survey aims at providing an overview of QRNGs to give an understanding of their underlying mechanisms.
We refer the reader to [Herrero-Collantes and Garcia-Escartin 2017; Stipčević and Koç 2014] for further details.
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Table 3. Summary of proposals for QRNGs
Randomness
source
QRNG Representative
reference
Detector Rate Weaknesses
Optical Conventional
[Jennewein et al.
2000]
Single-photon detector
(SPD)
Mbps Limited photon counting capabili-
ties
[Fürst et al. 2010] Photomultiplier tubes
SPD
Mbps Large variations in performance,
limited efficiency, complex imple-
mentations
[Dixon et al. 2008;
Ghioni et al. 2007]
Single photon avalanche
photodiodes
Mbps Limited performance
[Marsili et al. 2013] superconducting
nanowire SPD
NA Low operating temperature, lim-
ited signal-to-noise ratio, higher
probability of false detection events
Branching path [Jennewein et al.
2000]
SPA Mbps Imperfect unbalanced detectors, de-
tector dead time
Non-optical Radioactive decay [Lutz et al. 1999] PIN photodiodes kbps Complex implementationNoise [Stipčević 2004] comparator (an elec-
tronic circuit)
Mbps Complex implementation
beam splitter dividing the light between these detectors contribute to the bias in the generated bits.
There are some proposals on how to overcome these shortcomings, in particular, integrated optical
circuits inside silicon chips have been considered promising [Gräfe et al. 2014]. More concertedly,
for these circuits, less variability and mismatch are expected; hence, the quality of the random bits
could be improved.
Besides the above optical QRNGs, a wide variety of systems andmethodologies is used to quantum
states of the light to generate random bits, e.g., QRNGs based on quantum vacuum fluctuation,
photon counting, laser phase noise, to name a few. For more details on these QRNGs, we refer the
reader to [Herrero-Collantes and Garcia-Escartin 2017].
4.2.2 Non-optical Randomness Sources for QRNGs. Although optical randomness sources have been
widely adopted in practice, proposals for non-optical QRNGs have been introduced, for instance,
radioactive decay-based and noise-based QRNGs5 (see Table 3). The former family is interesting
due to the similarities between that and the optical QRNGs, whereas noise-based QRNGs are of
great importance as commercial products have been developed in compliance with this principle,
see, e.g., [Wilber 2013].
Radioactive decay: One of the first sources of randomness relying on quantum phenomena is
radioactive decay. In this context β radiation (emitted electrons) detectors have been mainly used,
e.g., Geiger-Müller cf. [Friedman 1949]. In this regard, an analogy that can be drawn between these
QRNGs and optical ones is interesting: the design of optical QRNGs is similar to ones applying the
notion of radio decay, with the difference being that radioactive source and the GM counter are
replaced by photon sources and detectors, respectively.
Generally speaking, radioactive decay-based QRNGs share some commonalities, namely using
digital counters to convert the pulses from the detector into random digits, and digital clocks.
Although being a high-quality randomness source, radioactive decay-based QRNGs suffer from
low bit rate, being hard-to-access and measure, and inherent physical limitations (e.g., dead time
-time to recover-, damage from radiations, etc.) [Herrero-Collantes and Garcia-Escartin 2017].
Noise: Noise as one of the most undesired characteristics of electronic circuits is, ironically enough,
one of the most preferred sources of randomness in such circuits, see, e.g., [Stipčević 2004]. For
both TRNGs and QRNGs, a noise source can be coupled with a comparator to generate random
bits. To this end, it can sometimes be necessary to amplify the noise before comparing that to
5For details on other classes of non-optical QRNGs, see [Herrero-Collantes and Garcia-Escartin 2017].
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a pre-defined threshold adjusted for the comparator. Furthermore, depending on how a random
staring is formed, instead of sampling the output, a series of pulses can be generated by passing the
signal from the noise source to the comparator. Regardless of this, when designing such a scheme,
three main challenges to be faced are (1) proving the randomness of the noise source, (2) dealing
with the effects of sampling/digitizing procedure, and (3) designing an adequate post-processing
module to obtain close-to-ideal bias [Stipčević and Koç 2014].
In order to design a noise-based QRNG, the noise corresponding to the shot fluctuation 6 can
be exploited; however, it is a challenging task to characterize and separate this type of noise from
thermal noise [Herrero-Collantes and Garcia-Escartin 2017; Stipčević and Koç 2014]. Even in some
cases, the current value of the signal depends on the signal(s) passing through the circuit in the
(near) past and can cause a correlation between random numbers generated, i.e., the so-called
memory effect [Stipčević and Koç 2014].
4.2.3 Certified QRNGs. Compared to TRNGs, for which it is challenging to guarantee the trust-
worthiness of either software or hardware, quantum mechanics enables us to assure this. More
specifically, the quality of the output stream in terms of being unbiased and uncorrelated can be
ensured through (1) self-testing, and (2) examining the inherent quantum statistical properties of a
QRNG. In the first class, there are methods, whose underlying idea is comparable to embedded
tests in the architecture of TRNGs, see Figure 6. Nevertheless, these tests are primarily focused
on measuring internal states and variables. As an example, to counteract the effect of maliciously
controlling the quantum state that is the source of randomness, state tomography can be em-
ployed [James et al. 2001]. However, for this type of test, repeated measurements on the same state
should be granted. Furthermore, they are mainly effective against adversaries with limited access
to the system, i.e., only the quantum state can be controlled. In addition to this, the security of
such schemes depends heavily on the assumption that the QRNG works perfectly, i.e., without
any memory effect cf. [Acín and Masanes 2016]. Even for more sophisticated self-testing methods
that can determine honest, technical noise and failures [Lunghi et al. 2015], making the above
assumption is necessary.
Device-independent QRNGs: These schemes are another attempt to certify the random bits,
where the randomness of the output is associated with physical laws, namely quantum non-locality,
Bell’s inequalities, and no-signaling principle, as explained below.
Quantum non-locality states that for an entangled state, measurements performed independently
on one of the separated particles set the state of the other particle. This correlation forms the
basis of Bell’s inequalities and quantum non-locality; that is, spatially separated systems have an
influence on one another in a non-local manner, i.e., without any signal passing between them (see,
Figure 7 and for a more detailed, precise definition, see [Brunner et al. 2014]). This condition on the
transmission of the signals is called the “no-signaling principle”, which means that the information
cannot be transmitted faster than the speed of light7.
One of the first randomness generators relying on the Bell’s inequalities has been suggested
in [Pironio et al. 2010] (its improved version [Pironio and Massar 2013]), where the randomness
of the outputs measured from two separated systems is certified. In this regard, to generate an
n-bit random string, a random seed should be given to the protocol, whose length is
√
n; hence,
this protocol expands the randomness. A similar method has been devised in [Vazirani and Vidick
2012], where the length of the seed could be reduced to (log2 n)3. It has been shown that the results
presented in [Pironio and Massar 2013; Vazirani and Vidick 2012] can be extended to a more general
6Shot noise can be produced from quantum effects due to the discrete nature of the electric charge and the particle nature
of light in electrical and optical devices, respectively.
7Note that the correlation between the particles in an entangled state does not rule out the no-signaling principle.
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Fig. 7. (Inspired by [Acín and Masanes 2016]) Some types of QRNGs discussed in Section 4.2: (a) A typical
QRNG employed by the user to generate bit strings that should be unpredictable by Eve, who can access
any physical system other than the user’s. Eve can also entangle her device with user’s QRNG, where the
entanglement is shown by the dashed chain. (b) A semi-device-independent scheme, more specifically, source-
device-independent QRNG. In this case, the quantum state preparation can be imperfect, and even under the
worst-case scenario, the device used to prepare the randomness is not trusted. (c) A general schematic of the
device-independent protocol. The user’s setup may contain more than two entangled devices. Eve can also
entangle her device with these devices.
model, where instead of quantum mechanics, solely the no-signaling principle must hold. Besides
these, schemes designed to meet the no-signaling principle include mainly randomness amplifiers,
see Section 4.2.4.
Another step towards reducing the reliance on quantum mechanics could be the study of
randomness generators obeying more general no-signaling rules cf. [Acín and Masanes 2016]. It has
been shown that such theories studied in, e.g., [Barrett et al. 2005], lead to general non-signaling
correlations; however, they cannot ensure the maximal randomness certification as the quantum
theory does [Barrett et al. 2006].
In line with the above methodology, various certified QRNGs have been proposed in the literature,
where other fundamental features of quantum theory are considered as an alternative for Bell’s
inequalities, namely contextuality [Um et al. 2013]. The main advantage of this type of certification
is that randomness from quantum origin can be differentiated from the randomness due to classical
noise and imperfections or failures in the QRNG cf. [Herrero-Collantes and Garcia-Escartin 2017].
Moreover, it is not required to ensure space-like separation between two systems involved in the
protocols, e.g., as applied in [Bierhorst et al. 2018]. Nonetheless, in contrast to device-independent
QRNGs discussed above, the security of such systems cannot be guaranteed against malicious
manufacture.
Semi-device-independent QRNGs: The core idea behind these QRNGs is extending the concept
of device-independent QRNGs beyond the notion of Bell’s inequalities, see, e.g., [Li et al. 2012]. In
this case, to certify quantum randomness, an experimental setup composed of a preparing device
and a measuring device. Whereas the measuring one performs measurements, the former device is
employed to prepare a system in different quantum states, assumed to be in a Hilbert space with a
bounded dimension. The certification is performed by examining dimension witnesses [Gallego
et al. 2010]. Although this allows non-entangled devices to be used, the efficiency of the protocol
should be verified experimentally. This shortcoming has been tackled in [Bowles et al. 2014] by
showing that if (a) the preparation and measuring device share no correlations, and (b) devices
do not suffer from memory effects, the randomness is certified regardless of the qubit detection
, Vol. XX, No. X, Article XXX. Publication date: May 2020.
Physical Security in the Post-quantum Era XXX:25
efficiency. Clearly, the second assumption cannot hold easily in practice, and therefore, the security
of a practical system is not proved.
In spite of the above disadvantage, a series of work has reported how semi-device-independent
QRNGs can be designed with regard to a set of assumptions [Vallone et al. 2014; Van Himbeeck
et al. 2017]. For instance, an assumption made regarding the preparation device, that is, the amount
of true randomness, which can be obtained by a given source, can be estimated [Vallone et al.
2014]. As another example of these, so-called, source device-independent schemes, [Smith et al.
2019] proposes a QRNGs with the goal of enhancing the practical implementation of semi-device-
independent devices. To this end, no additional optical components are required to implement their
continuous-variable optical quantum random number generator.
4.2.4 Randomness Extractors. For TRNGs, the idea behind the design of random extractors is
to cancel out the impact of aging, temperature variations, and even, attacks. First designed for
this purpose [Barak et al. 2003], extractors have found application for QRNGs. The fact that true
randomness is a key, intrinsic feature of quantum mechanics employed in the context of QRNGs
does not preclude the need for randomness extractors. Nevertheless, the main goals of these schemes
are quantum randomness expansion and quantum randomness amplification [Herrero-Collantes
and Garcia-Escartin 2017].
Similar to seeded randomness extractors, methods in the first category aim at obtaining a
relatively long, random bit sequence by feeding a small random seed to a quantum protocol. This
can be fulfilled through the composition, i.e., by concatenating a finite number of quantum devices,
which has been shown to be secure against quantum adversaries, see, e.g., [Coudron and Yuen
2014; Miller and Shi 2017]. It is also possible to go one step beyond this: given imperfect quantum
sources, a randomness extractor can be employed to certify the randomness of the output [Cao
et al. 2016b]. In doing so, one can address shortcomings of practical QRNGs, including losses,
multiphoton pulses, or unbalanced beam splitters affecting optical QRNGs. In addition to these, in
a broad sense, some of the device-independent QRNGs can fall into this category since they also
employ weak randomness generated in the non-locality experiments of Bell’s inequalities.
Clearly, for the randomness expansion, a uniform seed is required to either run the Bell test
(i.e., choosing the measurement setting) or improve the entropy for achieving a uniform output bit
string. To eliminate this requirement, yet meet the needs mentioned above, quantum randomness
amplification methods have been proposed. In their design, a weak source is combined with
independent quantum devices, where these devices are often restricted to simple measurements
on the different subsystems of an entangled state [Herrero-Collantes and Garcia-Escartin 2017].
In this regard, one of the most celebrated methods has been proposed in [Colbeck and Renner
2012]; however, a large amount of imperfect randomness is required. This has been addressed by
Ramanathan et al. [Ramanathan et al. 2016] that demonstrate a protocol requiring two devices.
Furthermore, in [Colbeck and Renner 2012], conditions on the min-entropy of a weak source
given as an input to the protocol have been defined, which can be hard to fulfill in practice. As a
remedy for this difficulty, approaches presented in [Bouda et al. 2014; Chung et al. 2014; Plesch
and Pivoluska 2014] can be considered. To further improve the robustness of random amplifiers
against noise, a protocol has been suggested in [Brandão et al. 2016], where using a finite number
of devices, arbitrary weak randomness can be amplified into nearly perfect random bits.
4.3 Attacks and Adversary Models
Among the premises, on which QRNGs are based, are providing trusted randomness sources and
generating numbers at a faster rate. While the latter can be required for specific purposes, e.g.,
online services relying on a stream of random data, the former requirement is imposed by virtually
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Fig. 8. Taxonomy of methods devised to offer randomness in the quantum world. Attacks and adversary
models discussed to assess the security of TRNGs and QRNGs have been depicted as well. Note that only
some of references reviewed in this paper are mentioned here.
all applications. In contrast to TRNGs, where the source of the randomness should be examined to
be random or, at least, exhibit an acceptable level of unpredictability, QRNGs harvest well-defined,
intrinsically random processes. Clearly, this feature of QRNGs makes them especially suitable for
quantum cryptography, with the need for a reliable randomness source.
On the other hand, similar to TRNGs, QRNGs can become an Achilles heel of cryptographic
systems. For instance, attacks against QKDs mainly target QRNGs (or randomness generator
modules) as the heart of these systems. In these attacks, the entire key may be extracted by the
adversary seamlessly, i.e., the honest parties exchanging the keys cannot find out that an attack has
happened. This is indeed against conditions defined for and features expected from random number
generators, namely unpredictability, and backward security. While unpredictability ensures that an
attacker knowing the whole sequence cannot guess the next bit with a probability better than one-
half, backward security means that knowing a part of the sequence does not result in the disclosure
of previous values of the generator with better accuracy than guessing [Herrero-Collantes and
Garcia-Escartin 2017].
This section explores attacks mounted on QRNGs that, in contrast to the above requirement, can
break the security of QRNGs. Moreover, adversary models suggested in the literature to evaluate
the security of QRNGs are discussed, see, Figure 8.
4.3.1 Side-channel Analysis. As explained in Section 4.1, attacks targeting TRNGs essentially take
advantage of the information leaked from TRNGs by either measuring the side-channels or by
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injecting a fault and then, measuring the side-channels. Similar to theses classical counterparts,
attackers can perform side-channel analysis on quantum devices. Although such attacks share
several similarities with ones launched on TRNGs, there are some differences between them: (a) to
conduct side-channel analysis on QRNGs, access to the device(s) may be required, (b) the adversary
can entangle her device with the devices used by honest parties to extract quantum side-channels.
One can, of course, draw an analogy between the latter difference and the fault injection attacks
launched on TRNGs.
First attempts at launching side-channel attacks on quantum devices have been made to break
the security of QKD systems. In this respect, e.g., by utilizing possible correlations between different
degrees of freedom of the photons (spatial, spectral, or temporal properties) with the actual bit
values, exchanged information can be revealed. Note that conducting such an analysis does not
lead to an error. As a prime example, the time-variant detection efficiency of photon detectors has
been exploited to launch an attack resulting in a bias [Zhao et al. 2008].
Side-channel information leakage caused by arbitrary imperfections in the implementation
of a QRNG forms another aspect of side-channel attacks. Timeshift attacks can fall within this
category, where the mismatch between the detection efficiency of detectors for the bits “0” and
“1” is exploited [Zhao et al. 2008]. In this regard, the arrival time of each signal is manipulated
by the adversary to induce bias in the system. Besides these attacks, on the same principles,
detector blinding attacks reported in [Gerhardt et al. 2011; Lydersen et al. 2010] have been proposed
cf. [Stipčević 2014]. For these attacks, it is crucial that the adversary can control the detectors at
the receiver side by performing, e.g., strong illumination that eliminates the randomness in the
measurement. In this context, attacks enjoying the undesirable, yet inevitable characteristics of
beam splitters, that is, wavelength-dependency have been studied in the literature [Li et al. 2011].
Another type of side-channel investigated in the literature can be referred to as “classical” side-
channel, where the quantum-related features of the system are not employed, but non-trivial
information about, e.g., the seed. The security of randomness expansion and recycling schemes can
be studied under this scenario, see, e.g., [De et al. 2012; Impagliazzo and Zuckerman 1989]. A more
interesting case has been examined in [Thewes et al. 2019], where classical side-channels, namely
the classical noise, can provide the attacker with information about the random number generated
by honest parties.
Recently, a new study has been carried out to explore the possibility of mounting the EM side-
channel attack on a QRNG [Gorbenko et al. 2017]. For this attack, it has been claimed that the EM
signal leaking from the extractor can be used to break the security of a QRNG. Although the idea
may seem plausible, further research on this is required to investigate various aspects of this attack
and its feasibility.
4.3.2 Adversary Models. When it comes to evaluating the randomness of a random number gen-
erator, the power of an adversary constitutes the other side of the coin. More specifically, we are
interested in examining if the output of the generator is random from the point of view of an
attacker with a specific power. Below, we describe models that take into consideration different
power levels for an adversary.
Non-signaling attackers: This model has been widely adopted in the literature, in particular,
studies on randomness amplification, see, e.g., [Acín and Masanes 2016; Dhara et al. 2014; Ra-
manathan et al. 2016]. In this model, there is no restriction imposed on the adversary rather than
the non-signaling principle. This principle states that faster-than-light communication between
devices, regardless of belonging to honest or malicious parties, is impossible.
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Note that although when considering this type of adversaries, it is not needed to rely on the
validity of quantum mechanics, QRNGs are still expected to generate correlations explained by
Bell’s inequalities.
Memory attacks: The scenario described by this model represents an exceptional situation, where
the device manufacturer misuses her access to the QRNG to launch the following attack [Barrett
et al. 2013]. The QRNGs is run to generate a long bit string, which is then stored into a memory stick
and sold as a proper generator to the user; however, the adversary (i.e., malicious manufacturer)
can perfectly predict the bits in the string. Needless to say that the bit string provided to the users
passes any statistical test and looks random.
Memory attacks have also been discussed under another scenario, where the memory embedded
in a device could be exploited to make information from past measurements available for future
measurements. Obviously, this is against the notion of the non-signaling principle; however, the
goal of the study presented in [Arnon-Friedman and Ta-Shma 2012] is to demonstrate that in the
presence of such memory, randomness amplification can be impossible.
Computationally unbounded adversary: The authors of [Brakerski et al. 2018] have studied
the design of an interesting certifiable QRNG, where instead of multiple quantum devices sharing
entanglement, a single computationally-bounded quantum device has been considered to run the
proposed protocol. This has been certified through the reduction to the hardness of the learning
with errors (LWE) problem. It has been further shown that even for a computationally unbounded
adversary, who may share entanglement with the generator, the output remains statistically in-
distinguishable from a uniformly random bit string. In fact, this type of adversaries is extremely
powerful; however, it has been proven that they cannot leverage the information leaked from the
entangled devices.
General entangled adversary: This model has been introduced to assess the security of extractors
that harvest the randomness from multiple independent sources. In this model, as its name implies,
the adversary with access to quantum sources share entanglement with the sources to obtain
side-channel information [Chung et al. 2014]. In order to remove interference among the sources,
when measuring the side-channel, it is suggested to conduct the measurement on each and every
source individually. This model can be considered as a generalization of models studied in [Kasher
and Kempe 2012] in the sense that limits have been imposed on neither how the side-channels from
different sources are combined nor the amount of information stored by the adversary cf. [Arnon-
Friedman et al. 2015]. The latter condition is known as the “bounded-storage” model, widely applied
in work related to the design of randomness extractors, see, e.g., [De et al. 2012; Ta-Shma 2011].
5 PHYSICALLY UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS
Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) cater to the requirement of a unique, unbiased yet reliable
fingerprint for anti-counterfeiting, responses for authentication, and volatile key for cryptographic
schemes in today’s world. PUFs are used for device authentication and key-generation purposes
for cryptographic algorithms and form the backbone of major authentication protocols used in
cryptography. PUFs are also popular for secured storage of sensitive data like cryptographic
keys and are one of the major research topics among security primitives. The initial idea of such
unclonable, repeatable, and volatile secrets was first coined as “physical one-way functions” by
R. Pappu et al. in [Pappu et al. 2002]. Later, it was extended to silicon by utilizing the process
variations of a chip by Gassend et al. in [Gassend et al. 2002] for “silicon PUFs”. Silicon PUFs utilize
the random manufacturing variations within a silicon chip and generate a unique, unclonable
identification key from it. The output of a PUF is recorded in the form of challenge-response pairs
(CRPs) which, are generated by physically querying the PUF and computing its response. Research
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in silicon PUFs has investigated secret generation based on metastability, race conditions, etc. in
different units present in a silicon chip including memory (DRAM, SRAM, etc.), ring oscillators
(ROs), comparators, latches, current mirrors, etc.
In the literature, PUFs have been categorized based on their structure, performance, or the
number of CRPs generated by them. In this paper, we will separate PUFs into two categories: PUFs
in the classical era and PUFs in the post-quantum era. According to [Arapinis et al. 2019], classical
PUFs generate classical CRPs and also limit the adversary to only classical interactions with the PUF.
In other words, both the authentication and key-generation process include physical characteristics
that are only defined by classical mechanics and do not adhere to generation or interaction with
quantum particles or quantum bits. With the advent of the state-of-art research on quantum
supercomputers as described in Section 2, restricting the adversary to only the classical domain
may camouflage potential vulnerabilities within the PUF architecture, thus leading to incorrect
evaluation. So, for correct performance and security evaluation, PUFs must also be assessed in the
quantum domain where the adversary is allowed to perform quantum interactions with the PUF
system. This motivates us towards a new perspective of PUFs in the post-quantum era. Overall, we
have divided the state-of-art research for PUFs in the quantum domain into two major divisions, a)
Defense covers the architectures and design of several PUFs as well as authentication protocols
with both quantum and classical architectures, built to defend against cloning, piracy, and attacks
incorporating quantum attacks. This can be seen in the taxonomy shown below, as depicted in
Figure 9; b) Attacks against PUFs in both classical and quantum domains. We describe both the
domains in detail in the following sections providing perspectives for current state-of-art research
in PUFs.
5.1 PUF Preliminaries: Pre-Quantum Era
Silicon PUFs utilize the process variations within a chip to generate unique fingerprints. Thus, two
chips, in spite of possessing the same design and architecture, will produce different CRPs, leading
to a one-to-one mapping of every individual chip produced by a company. State-of-the-art work on
silicon PUFs can be divided into three types as shown in [Zhang et al. 2014]: 1) Delay based PUFs
consist of a delay chain producing unique delays due to process variations as seen in Arbiter PUF,
RO PUF, etc. [Suh and Devadas 2007]; 2)Memory based PUFs are mainly comprised of memory cells
like SRAM [Layman et al. 2002], DRAM [Tang et al. 2017], etc. and use their start-up characteristics
to generate unique binary strings. 3) Analog electronic PUFs form a rather contemporary category
targeted towards analog and mixed-signal ICs. Some instances include mono-stable current mirror
PUF in [Alvarez et al. 2015], PTAT (proportional to absolute temperature) PUF in [Li and Seok
2016], etc. It must be noted that these existing PUFs are meant completely for the classic world and
do not have any quantum connotations associated with them. Neither the architecture is based
on quantum phenomena, nor the architecture provides any robustness against quantum attacks.
Thus, loosely these PUFs can be termed as PUFs in the pre-quantum era. The most commonly
used metrics for PUFs aim to measure their suitability for the aforementioned applications. A PUF
signature should be impossible to recreate. In other words, there must be a large variation between
the responses of any two PUF instances (in different devices). This referred to as “uniqueness” of
a PUF and is measured by the inter-chip Hamming Distance (HD). The “reliability” of a PUF, i.e.,
ability to recreate its output upon measurement, is measured by intra-chip HD.
Classical PUFs belong to a mature research field that includes various architectures and authen-
tication schemes. Despite several research works that have been conducted in the classical PUF
domain, many of them can be vulnerable to attacks in the post-quantum era. In our future sections,
we describe in detail the PUFs which belong to quantum-era and the advantages/disadvantages
associated with it.
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Fig. 9. PUF Taxonomy in post-quantum era showing research work explored in both defense and attack
categories.
5.2 Defense: Innovative PUF architectures for Anti-counterfeiting and for Preventing
Quantum Attacks
While reviewing PUFs in the post-quantum era, there are two interdependent aspects that one
needs to consider, as shown in the taxonomy in Figure 9, a) Quantum-generated PUFs or Quantum
PUFs that utilize properties inherent in quantum interactions for PUFs. Note that these PUFs may or
may not be secure against quantum adversaries, which takes us to b) Classical quantum-secure PUFs.
These represent examples of PUFs that have already been proven secure against quantum attacks. A
detailed representation of the characteristics of the quantum generated and quantum secure PUFs
have been presented in table 4. It must be understood that the existence of a quantum adversary can
jeopardize the security of PUFs that have already been claimed secure against traditional machine
learning (ML) attacks. Thus, we require special architecture for PUFs that provide resilience against
quantum attacks. In conclusion, the availability of quantum systems can completely transform the
traditional viewpoint for PUFs. In our next subsections, we try to answer the persisting questions
regarding PUFs in the post-quantum world, imploring a new line of research approach for PUFs.
5.2.1 Quantum-generated PUFs orQuantum PUFs (QPUFs). In contrary to classical PUFs, quantum-
generated PUFs originate owing to a certain quantum phenomenon associated with any device.
The inherent properties of a qubit can bolster the architecture of a PUF in meaningful ways. A
qubit is immediately lost after it has been measured; thus, it is impossible to physically clone a
qubit. If the adversary is unaware of the measurement procedure, it is almost impossible for an
adversary to reproduce a qubit. Thus, quantum properties of a device can be utilized to generate a
PUF, and a few such instances have appeared so far in literature for novel quantum PUFs.
Resonant Tunneling Diode (RTD) - PUF: In [Roberts et al. 2015], the authors use the quantum
tunneling using a resonant tunneling diode (RTD) consisting of a quantum well to generate a
PUF. RTD consists of a quantum well surrounded by two energy barriers such that only electrons
possessing a specific energy level can tunnel through the device. The voltage across the device
represents the ratio of the energy of the confined quantum well to the energy level of the emitter,
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Table 4. Quantum-generated and quantum-secure PUFs and their respective characteristics
Type Name Phenomenaused Challenges Response
Security
advantages Applications
Quantum
generated
PUFs
RTD PUF
[Roberts et al. 2015]
Quantum
tunneling
Voltage
across
device
Current peak
Unclonability, uniqueness
with minimal resources
and small dimension
Security application
requiring small area,
width, power etc.
QR PUF
[Škorić 2012]
Optical
scattering
Single
photons Quantum states
Remote authentication
without trusted readers
Authentication
protocols
Optical Quantum PUF
[Cao et al. 2017]
Defects in
mono-layer
materials
Incident light
frequency and
intensity
Output
multi-frequency,
multi-intensity
spectrum
Unclonability,
uniqueness
Counterfeit
detection
SET PUF
[Tanamoto et al. 2019]
Single
electron
tunneling
Gate voltage
Drain current
generating
patterns called
coulomb diamonds
Unclonability,
uniqueness
Device
authentication
Quantum
secure
PUFs
Lattice PUF
[Wang et al. 2019]
SRAM POK and
LWE decryption
Classical
digital
challenge
bits
Classical SRAM
startup response
Output not PAC
learnable; secure
against classical
and quantum ML
attacks
Authentication
requiring security
against classical
and quantum
attacks
Stateless-Cryptographic
PUF [Herder et al. 2017] Fuzzy extractors
Classical
digital
challenge
bits
Difference in RO
frequncy
LPN-hard; secured against
classical and quantum
attacks
Authentication
requiring security
against quantum
attacks
whereas the current through the diode indicates the total number of electrons tunneling. The
authors inspect the current-voltage curves generated from each RTD device. The position of the
current peaks with respect to the applied voltage presents an inherent quantum property of each
device, which can be used to generate a quantum PUF. Due to process variation, the position of the
current peak is unique for a single device, thus generating a fingerprint depending on the quantum
property of the device. The authors explain that such a quantum PUF is capable of producing
approximately 1000 unclonable identifiers, which can be further increased by putting multiple
devices in an array. Since the authors have not mentioned anything about the reliability of the
RTD PUF, it is arguable how much the device signature is repeatable across environmental and
temporal variations.
Quantum readout (QR) - PUF: In [Škorić 2012], the authors developed a quantum-readout (QR)
PUF, where a classical PUF was challenged by a quantum state (referred as a single photon-state)
generating a quantum response. For example, an optical PUF, challenged by photon states instead of
a classical light beam producing a quantum state as a response. In this case, they used single-photon
states through an optical fiber to challenge the PUF. The number of challenges was limited owing
to the sparse number of transversal modes carried by the optical fiber. Yet, the presence of multiple
wavelengths aided the increment of the number of available challenges. The major advantage of
the QR-PUF, as discussed by the authors, is the possibility of remote authentication without the
availability of trusted readers. The remote authentication protocol has been further extended in
[Škorić et al. 2017], which allows the receiver to verify that the data has been sent by the PUF
holder. In short, the unclonability of quantum states prevents the attacker from intercepting the
data sent over by the QR-PUF. In case of an interception, the PUF response changes owing to the
inherent property of quantum states, warning the receiver. It has also been assumed that all the
properties of QR-PUF are public except the challenge states, and with the help of security analysis,
the authors prove that it is not feasible to build a quantum computer that can emulate the QR-PUF.
Optical Quantum PUF: An optical quantum PUF as described in [Cao et al. 2017], uses nanoscale
defects within 2D sheets to uniquely identify devices. Imperfections within monolayer materials
like transition metal dichalcogenides (TMD) alter the bandgap structure of the semiconductor.
Thus, when light is incident on the monolayer, it generates a spectrum of lights with various
frequencies and intensities at different locations, depending on the intrinsic imperfections. The
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Fig. 10. A general structure representing the authentication protocol using PUFs consisting of enrollment
and verification stages.
emitted spectrum is collected by a lens and passed through a band-pass filter (BPF). The angular
orientation and the bandwidth of the BPF, as well as the spatial position across the monolayer, can
be seen as the challenge to the PUF whereas the intensity and frequency of the light emitted by
the monolayer and later collected by a charge-coupled device (CCD) can be seen as the response.
Unclonability and utilization in counterfeit detection have been claimed as the major usage for this
PUF by the authors.
PUF based on single-electron tunneling (SET): Another instance of a quantum PUF surfaced
recently in [Tanamoto et al. 2019], which, can generate device fingerprints using the SET effect.
When a countable number of electrons is confined within a small space then, SET can be observed.
SET generates quantum dots (QDs) containing confined electrons at discrete energy levels, which
produces unique fingerprints in measured drain currents relative to the varying gate voltage. The
technology can be used to identify chips and represent a "quantum version of PUF," as described by
the authors.
The inherent no-cloning property of quantum gates and algorithms can prove immensely ben-
eficial for security primitive architectures and is one of the main advantages of the above PUFs
designed from quantum phenomena. Nonetheless, it is still a beginning for quantum-generated
PUFs and thus requires fresh ideas and research in the domain. An important research direction
can be the quantification of metrics for quantum PUFs. The metrics for classical PUFs have been
well-researched, but it must be noted that similar metrics may not be sufficient for evaluating
quantum PUFs since there are differences in their basic principles of operation. The major metrics
signifying performance for a classical PUF include uniqueness, reliability, and randomness. While
most of the above quantum PUFs provide a unique output, reliability is still a question for them.
According to our knowledge, very little has been specified about the reliability of these quantum
PUFs. Also, to calculate reliability for quantum PUFs, it must be understood whether the quantum
properties change at all with varying external conditions. More specifically, the type of conditions
against which reliability needs to be tested must be formulated. It has been shown in [Gianfelici
et al. 2020] that certain fundamental properties of quantum PUFs can adversely affect the reliability.
Here, the authors mention that the property of non-orthogonality of the quantum challenges
provide unclonability but also can introduce errors in measurement, thus reducing the reliability.
5.2.2 Classical Quantum-secure PUFs. The advent of quantum technologies has increased the
vulnerabilities of security primitives, assisting attacks against PUFs by reducing the complexity
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of computation and time to brute-force. Thus designing PUFs that are provably secure against
quantum attacks remains a priority. There are a few instances of classical PUF architectures that
have been proposed so far, which provide resistance against ML attacks in both classical as well
as quantum domains. It must be noted that the design architecture of all these PUFs pertain to
classical systems and do not generate responses based on quantum interactions. Nevertheless, the
responses provided by these PUFs can be mathematically proven to be secure against quantum
attacks based on their inherent architectures.
Lattice PUF: In [Wang et al. 2019], a strong PUF is built, which is provably secure against ML
attacks both in classical and quantum computations. The lattice PUF comprises of a physically
obfuscated key (POK) and a learning with errors (LWE) decryption function that generates the
response relative to the challenges given to the PUF. To evaluate the robustness of the lattice PUF,
the authors introduce a metric called ML resistance. A PUF is defined to have k-bit ML resistance if
an ML attack requires 2k attempts to break it. The proposed lattice PUF produces a CRP size of 2136
and can provide 128-bit ML resistance. The authors claim that the major advantage of the lattice
PUF is that it derives its security from the fact that the decryption function used in the lattice PUF
is not PAC (probably approximately correct framework)-learnable.
Stateless Cryptographic PUF: In [Herder et al. 2017], a cryptographically secure PUF is built
from learning parity with noise (LPN) hard fuzzy extractor. Fuzzy extractors are cryptographic
structures that eliminate the noise from biometric data (either human or silicon) and generate
random, uniform keys for security and cryptographic applications. The authors at first provide a
fuzzy extractor that can correctO(m) errors in polynomial time from a biometric source. This fuzzy
extractor is used to generate a cryptographically secure PUF, which is LPN (learning parity with
noise)-hard and thus cannot be broken by classical as well as quantum attacks. The PUF realizes a
POK, which consists of a series of RO pairs. The frequency of each RO in a RO pair is counted, and a
subtractor generates the difference between them. The difference is defined as the confidence value,
which forms the entropy source of the RO. An FPGA implementation of thus PUF was provided in
[Jin et al. 2017]. A TRNG generates the challenges for the PUF, and an LPN-hard POK produces the
response.
5.2.3 Quantum-secure Authentication of PUFs. Apart from PUF architectures, the authentication
protocols utilized to ensure secure communication in cryptographic IPs are also at risk against
quantum adversaries. An example structure of general authentication protocols consisting of a PUF
is shown in Figure 10. Any such authentication protocol consists of an enrollment phase where the
general challenge-response pairs are generated and enrolled in the database. When the protocol is
deployed in an IP or any other channel to provide security and verify a specific set of challenges,
the verification phase starts. In order to ensure such protocols are secure against quantum attacks,
new authentication protocols have been proposed keeping in mind the resilience against quantum
attacks. A comprehensive summary of such protocols has been provided in the table 5. Many of
these authentication protocols derive their security mostly from NP-hard problems like LPN and
thus can be termed secure against quantum attacks.
PUF-HB: In [Hammouri and Sunar 2008], a protocol is proposed that uses an amalgamation of
PUF and the Hopper Blum (HB) function (thus, it is dubbed PUF-HB). Authentication protocols
using HB function were first proposed by Hopper and Blum [Hopper and Blum 2001] and have
major advantages like the reduction of power consumption for pervasive networks. The security of
the protocol is based on the hardness of the LPN problem making the PUF resilient against classical
as well as quantum attacks. The PUF-HB authentication protocol consists of two entities: the tag
and the reader. The tag uses the PUF response and a few bit vectors to compute a response for a
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Table 5. Summary of quantum authentication protocols
Authentication
scheme Type of PUF used Algorithm used Advantages/Contribution Limitations
PUF-HB
[Hammouri and Sunar 2008] Classical PUF
Hopper Blum
function
Tamper resilient, unclonable
LPN-hard, secure against
classical and quantum
attacks
Performance against
quantum attacks like
challenge estimation,
quantum emulation
not shown
QR-PUF authentication
[Gianfelici et al. 2020] QR-PUFs
Entity
authentication
protocols
Characterization of
QR PUF metrics like
uniqueness and reliability
against classical PUFs
No suggestion
provided to improve
reliability of QR-PUFs
Quantum-secure
authentication
[Goorden et al. 2014]
Classical optical
PUF
Application
of quantum
challenges to
optical PUF
Resilient against emulation
attacks
Metrics like reliability
and uniqueness of the
PUF not discussed
Continuous-variable
authentication
[Nikolopoulos and Diamanti 2017]
[Nikolopoulos 2018]
Classical optical
PUF
Application
of quantum
challenges using
coherent states
of light
Resilient against emulation
attacks
Metrics like reliability
and uniqueness of the
PUF not discussed
given challenge and sends it to the reader. The reader computes the same using the database and
authenticates the response as correct or incorrect for a series of authentication rounds. After the
predefined number of rounds is completed, the reader authenticates the response only when the
number of incorrect responses is within a predetermined level of tolerance. Given the fact that
the LPN problem is noise parity (NP) hard, the PUF-HB protocol is provably secure against active
attackers. The authors claim that the given authentication protocol does not store the intermediate
PUF response, which is used to compute the function. Hence, there is no way that the attacker can
tamper the PUF to extract the PUF response and attempt to clone the PUF-HB protocol, which
proves the PUF to be tamper-resilient as well.
QR-PUF authentication: Quantum PUFs cannot be cloned, and this is a major advantage of
quantum PUFs over classical PUFs. In [Gianfelici et al. 2020], the authors extend the metrics of
uniqueness and robustness of a classical PUF to characterize quantum PUFs like QR-PUFs [Škorić
2012]. Here, the authors design a generalized authentication scheme that can be applied to both
classical and quantum PUFs like QR-PUFs (described in subsection 5.2). By comparing the quantum
PUFs against classical PUFs, the authors conclude that classical measurements can be observed
without disturbing the current state of a classical PUF; thus, the response can be easily copied.
Thus, for a classical PUF after q interactions, an adversary will know exactly q CRPs, which
can be used to create a clone of the classical PUF. But for quantum PUFs, it is difficult to copy
quantum states, and also measurements will introduce errors in the quantum response. Thus after
q interactions, the adversary will have less than q CRPs to clone the quantum PUF. This makes
a quantum PUF like QR-PUF much superior in terms of unclonability. The authors also mention
that quantum challenges are non-orthogonal in nature; thus, a quantum PUF cannot distinguish
between states. This non-orthogonality of challenges helps the no-cloning property but introduces
errors in measurement, thus undermining robustness.
Quantum-secure authentication (QSA): The QSA technique proposed in [Goorden et al. 2014]
uses a quantum state as a challenge instead of classical states. The authors argue that the traditional
optical physically unclonable key (PUK) based authentication protocols rely on classical challenges.
Thus, if the attacker has access to the authentication protocol and possesses sufficient information
about the CRP characteristics, then they can intercept the classical challenges sent to the verifier.
The adversary can then emulate an attack by measuring such challenges and sending them to the
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verifier and can easily receive correct responses. In that case, the attacker does not need to clone
the quantum PUF. This kind of attack is termed as an "emulation attack”. However, if the challenges
are based on quantum states which are inherently unclonable, then the attacker will not be able
to clone the challenges and obtain a valid response. The authentication protocol authenticates a
classical multiple-scattering key by interrogating it with a light pulse and verifying the spacial
structure of the reflected light.
Continuous variable authentication protocol: In [Nikolopoulos and Diamanti 2017], the au-
thors propose an authentication protocol using optical PUFs. The major proposition is the usage
of quantum challenges instead of classical ones, similar to the QSA technique described above.
The proposed authentication scheme aims at using quantum challenges derived from random
coherent states of light. The quadrature structures formed by the scattering of light originating
from the laser source is analyzed by a coarse-grained homodyne detector. The homodyne de-
tection helps in extracting information from the phase and frequency of the quadrature light
structures. In [Nikolopoulos 2018], the security of the above authentication protocol has been
analyzed against emulation attacks. The authors use Helevo’s bounds and Fano’s inequality to
prove that the continuous variable scheme is secured against emulation attacks.
The concept of security against quantum attacks has emerged due to advancements in the fields
of the quantum supercomputer. The impact of such discoveries on hardware security is still an
open-ended problem, and a lot needs to be investigated to assure security for PUFs in the quantum
world that can solve active quantum attacks. Quantum superiority seems to be a double-edged
sword, which has provided many advancements in security primitives like the design of quantum
PUFs. The inherent principles of unclonability further strengthen the PUF performance and increase
tamper resilience and man-in-middle attacks for quantum PUFs. On the other hand, the presence of
quantum technology introduces several vulnerabilities in existing security primitives, compromising
several cryptographic and security protocols. Quantum technology profits the defended as well
as the attacker. In our next section, we try to look at several attack strategies against PUFs in the
post-quantum era.
5.3 Attacks against PUFs in PostQuantum Era
Attacks can occur against a) classical PUFs or b) quantum PUFs. Attack strategies against classical
PUFs are a well-researched topic and include a wide range of attacks, as discussed below. Attacks
against quantum PUFs is a relatively new topic and still needs a lot of work.
5.3.1 Attacks against Classical PUFs. In general, the attacks against classical PUFs can be divided
into two major subsections a) classical attacks where the adversary does not possess any quan-
tum processing capability and b) quantum attacks where the attacker has quantum computation
competence, and we discuss the state-of-art works in both the sections below.
Attacks against classical PUFs can be divided into three main categories, namely a) invasive
attacks, b) semi-invasive or side-channel attacks, and c) non-invasive or software/ machine learning
(ML) attacks. Invasive attacks on PUFs are capable of altering the physical structure of the PUFs
leading to the extraction of decrypted data and completely changing the PUF configuration. An
example attack can be seen in [Helfmeier et al. 2013], where the attackers permanently modify
the device security fuses by invasive focused-ion-beam (FIB) circuit edit and decipher sensitive
data using backside micro probing. Semi-invasive attacks on PUFs include an amalgamation of
fault-injection/side-channel attacks along with an ML framework to decode sensitive CRP behavior
from the PUFs. In [Tajik et al. 2015], the attackers use laser fault injection attacks coupled with
ML algorithms to alter configurations and compromise the security of XOR-arbiter and RO PUFs
implemented in programmable logic devices (180nm). For non-invasive or ML attacks, the attacker
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uses a small subset of the CRPs of the PUF and tries to build a model representing the challenge-
response behavior of the PUF. The first ML attack against PUFs was implemented in [Gassend et al.
2004], and after that, different types of ML attacks have been developed against PUFs. ML attacks
against classical PUFs can be divided into two types a) empirical attacks and b) PAC (probably
approximately correct) framework. Empirical ML approaches [Rührmair et al. 2010] do not have
any predefined level of confidence or accuracy, whereas the PAC framework develops models with
specified levels of accuracy, as seen in papers like [Ganji et al. 2014, 2015].
5.3.2 Attacks against Quantum PUFs. The security of quantum readout PUFs against challenge
estimation attacks has been shown in [Škorić et al. 2013]. This is an example of a classical attack
possible against quantum PUFs, and the authors provide an analysis of the security of the respective
PUF against such attacks. In this scenario, the adversary has access to the verification protocol
and intercepts the challenge quantum state. The attacker then performs a measurement on the
challenge state and reconstructs the challenge to emulate the PUF. Though this attack can be
implemented against quantum secure authentication protocol, which uses a classical challenge, it
cannot be used against protocols that use quantum states as challenges, as in this case, the attacker
cannot measure a quantum state, making the attack ineffective. The QSA [Goorden et al. 2014]
and continuous variable authentication protocols [Nikolopoulos and Diamanti 2017] described
above are robust against such forms of attack. The QR PUF has also been analyzed to be resilient
against such attacks, as mentioned in [Škorić et al. 2013]. The authors claim that the number of
photons detected in the verification protocol is lower by more than a factor of the quantum security
parameter (S) 8 defined in the paper making the QR PUF robust against such classical attack.
Another form of attack is based on quantum interactions, where the attacker has quantum
capabilities and the system which is attacked consists of a quantum PUF (QPUF). One example of
such an attack is the quantum emulation attack, as described in [Arapinis et al. 2019], where the
adversary uses quantum emulation (QE) algorithm [Marvian and Lloyd 2016] to attack a QPUF.
The authors mention QPUFs as quantum channels with the standard inherent quantum qualities
of unclonability, robustness, and collision resistance. The authors further explain that due to the
property of collision resistance of the QPUFs, they can be modeled by unitary transformations, and
thus such PUFs are termed in the paper as unitary quantum PUFs or UQPUFs. The authors prove
that quantum emulation attacks can easily compromise the unclonability property of the UQPUFs.
If the adversary can choose the target challenge themselves, then quantum primitives are unable
to provide security against such adversaries. Also, if the attacker has access to the challenge and
can interrogate the primitive after receiving the challenge, then no current quantum primitive can
protect against such attacks. In short, the authors show that the unclonability property of UQPUFs
can be compromised by quantum emulation attacks. Another important aspect of emulation attacks
has been shown in [Fladung et al. 2019]. Here the authors use a similar framework of intercept-
emulation attacks investigated in [Nikolopoulos 2018]; they assume that the adversary has access
to a copy of the numerical CRPs and intercepts the measurement apparatus to make an educated
guess regarding the other security parameters required to induce the correct response state of the
verifier. The paper discusses the robustness of continuous variable authentication protocol against
three types of emulation attacks and discusses the security metrics, which ensures the security of
the protocol against all the mentioned attacks.
The metric which signifies the robustness of classical PUFs against modeling attacks is unclon-
ability. While, it has been stated in several papers like [Gianfelici et al. 2020], [Škorić 2012], that
quantum PUFs are superior to classical PUFs in terms of unclonability. But with the advent of
novel attacks like quantum emulation and classical challenge estimation attacks as described before,
8S = Kn , where K is the order of the information contained in the challenge and n is the total number of photons
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the unclonability property of quantum PUFs can be compromised. With the advent of new attack
strategies, new authentication protocols have also been proposed which claim to protect against
the above attacks, but all these protocols have their common set of advantages and limitations, as
described in table 5. Also, the property of unclonability adversely affects other metrics of quantum
PUFs like reliability. Thus, an optimum trade-off of the above metrics is required that can produce
an unclonable, as well as a reliable quantum PUF.
6 GENERAL CONCLUSION AND LESSONS LEARNED
Albeit being broadly acknowledged and studied, applications of quantum technology in cryptog-
raphy, and in particular, physical security, need more effort and more cooperative attention to
become widely-deployed, global solutions. In this context, one of the key challenges facing the
researchers is the realization of a complex system composed of various classical and quantum
modules. For such a system, a solid foundation must be laid for the assessment of security, and
accordingly, for the definition of metrics and design of tests matching the requirements of real-life
applications. This, of course, demands standardization efforts, supported and promoted by national
and international standardization bodies. An essential part of these standardization activities is
examining whether new proposals for post-quantum cryptosystems can stand the test of time, and
more specifically, investigating the vulnerability of these systems to various attacks.
With respect to this observation, fundamental studies on the resistance of post-quantum cryp-
tosystems to quantum-enhanced and classical, physical attacks should be pursued. In order to
complement these studies, it is necessary to come up with approaches concerning how to harness
the power of quantum mechanics in physical primitives that can prevent physical attacks. These
primitives must be in compliance with real-world conditions, e.g., capabilities of users and attackers,
to provide the required security, when the current physical countermeasures are no longer effective.
By conducting an extensive review of the literature, this survey attempts to provide useful insights
into the challenges associated with these matters, summarized as follows.
• Side-channel analysis: Along with the development of numerous quantum-resistant crypto-
graphic schemes, as discussed above, their standardization has been in progress. While those
post-quantum algorithms may be proven quantum-resistant, they are not necessarily resistant
against classical side-channel attacks. These attacks can be extremely powerful, as they exploit
physical data leakage from the device. Side-channel attacks on post-quantum algorithms can be
still thought to be less harmful, as they are not implemented into commercial systems yet.
To protect post-quantum cryptographic schemes against power analysis, first-order masking
and hiding are used to introduce the noise; however, both have been broken. Hiding is done
by inserting dummy and by shuffling operations, such as randomization of row iteration for
matrix-vector multiplication. Timing attacks are halted by the introduction of constant operations,
such as constant multiplication, or constant calling of hash functions. Countermeasure, which
would secure against timing and SPA attacks, proposed in [von Maurich and Güneysu 2014],
requires redundant addition always being performed, making runtime independent of secret
value and message. Proposed countermeasures against fault attacks which exploit vulnerabilities
in error correction, require encryption and decryption to be implemented as a nested procedure
inside the scheme, because if the correct decryption of the message means message does not have
any errors, as proposed in [Cayrel and Dusart 2010]. For fault analysis attacks which introduce
randomization, skipping and zeroing, simple checking and comparisons of the correctness of
secret key are proposed to prevent the attacks.
Compared to SCA launched on classical devices, the attacks on post-quantum cryptographic
schemes do not have to break strong countermeasures as the first step. Their development is in
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very early stages, compared to countermeasures against SCA on classical algorithms, such as
sense-amplified-based logic (SABL), wave dynamic differential logic, and t-private logic circuits.
Most of the post-quantum countermeasures are not provably secure, and they protect against a
specific attack while being compromised by others.
However, the current security of post-quantum algorithms lies in algorithm complexity. These
algorithms have computations almost inherent to secret keys through the variousmatrix and linear
algebraic properties. The attacker is challenged to find computations dependent on secret keys
and values, which can be controlled, in order to exploit the secret key. Further research must be
done in assessing the vulnerabilities of post-quantum algorithms and developing countermeasures
that would protect against various side-channel attacks, as well as invasive physical probing,
which has not been evaluated yet.
Side-channel attacks in the quantum world are also considered to take advantage of the quantum
device itself. Data acquisition does not benefit from quantum speed-ups, so the quantum algorithm
application is not evaluated for this application. However, the key search is the SCA step, which
can greatly benefit from quantum speed-up, and Grover’s quantum algorithm seems to be the
best option for this purpose, regardless of the limitation of requiring unstructured input data.
The danger of SCA on post-quantum cryptographic schemes that are heavily developed and
evaluated is large. Due to the novelty of many post-quantum cryptographic schemes, many side-
channel vulnerabilities are not yet evaluated. Current countermeasures for extensively researched
post-quantum algorithms have an ad-hoc design, which protects against a specific version of SCA,
while it does not protect against other attacks. Security of most novel post-quantum cryptographic
schemes relies on original algorithm structure, and lack of SCA attempts. The use of quantum
algorithms may not be useful for SCA data acquisition from classical schemes. However, its
usefulness could be evaluated for the search of post-quantum computation intermediate values,
which depend on the secret key and controlled message.
• Random number generators: Throughout the journey of random number generators from
Vernam’s one-time pad to Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices, the ability to communicate securely
and compute efficiently remains a common goal. In particular, for the IoT technology, generators
with smaller implementation overhead, being cheap enough, and fast enough for widespread
use are preferred. QRNGs can be thought of as promising candidates fulfilling these needs,
under the premise that they can circumvent practical difficulties with TRNGs, namely limited
generation rate, no guarantee on intrinsic randomness, challenges with failure and online tests.
The latter problem is indeed not specific to TRNGs since QRNGs also require quantum sources
to be examined frequently in order to avoid any defect and interference. Hence, it is essential
to meet the demand for highly accurate and reliable testing approaches, especially self-testing
methods. Fortunately enough, these methods have been studied in the context of TRNGs, and
interestingly, proposals have been made to be adopted by the TRNGs and QRNGs simultaneously.
Regardless of how a self-testing is built, entropy estimation is a key building block of that.
Another area of research related to this is randomness amplification that has been reviewed in
this survey. More specifically, if the results of a test at the startup stage demonstrate a lack of
enough entropy that can be extracted from the QRNG, randomness amplification techniques
come into play. As explained before, these techniques, however, may suffer from several problems
in practice. It is particularly true concerning how confidently the true randomness of a source
can be determined. We believe that this can be seen as a future research direction. Furthermore,
it is of great importance to come up with high-quality, electronic chip-based quantum sources
that can be easily embedded in commercial devices. For such devices, not only the generation
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rate, but also the implementation cost and the compatibility with off-the-shelf systems are crucial
aspects of the design.
To sum up, we stress that advances in the theory and implementation of QRNGs will eventually
lead to the design of more robust and practically feasible encryption, key distribution, and in
general, cryptography and other applications relying on true random numbers.
• Physically unclonable functions: Silicon PUFs are defined as one of the major developments
of hardware security primitives and entail a mature research field. Compared to classical PUFs,
post-quantum research in PUFs is a nascent field. In this survey, we presented a comprehensive
overview of the current research that has been conducted so far related to PUFs in the post-
quantum era. We have divided our study into two major fields; one concerns with the defense
and improvement of PUF architectures to protect against new innovations concerning quantum
adversaries. Here, we have discussed PUF architectures that originate from quantum phenomena
along with their advantages and disadvantages.
We have also discussed the different authentication protocols involving PUFs that have been
proposed to defend against quantum-adversaries along with a thorough survey of classical PUFs
that are claimed secure against existing quantum attacks. The other section involved different
attack strategies that have emerged with the quantum advancement. To provide perspective, we
outlined the major attack strategies against classical PUFs and then moved on to different forms
of attacks developed so far both against quantum PUFs. To the best of our knowledge, this is one
of the preliminary surveys which aims at reviewing the state-of-art research in post-quantum
PUFs.
In retrospect, the research performed so far in the post-quantum PUF era includes both defense
and attack mechanisms. Quantum phenomena have been used to generate useful unclonable
PUF architectures. Authentication protocols that are robust against quantum attacks have been
proposed. Yet, there still exists a lack of organization, and the work done so far can be termed
ad-hoc. Quantum computing is a powerful weapon that can impact the field of security as a
double-edged sword. The advantages of unclonability in quantum domain strengthens PUF
architectures against quantum attackers but also undermines the reliability metric of the PUF.
Thus, a prospective field of research may include the improvement of reliability for quantum
PUFs allowing an optimum unclonability. The existence of NP-hard authentication protocols
provides potential prospective security solutions against quantum attacks. Nevertheless, better
evaluation algorithms are required, and a new set of metrics needs to be formulated to ensure
the security PUFs against quantum attacks. Once a proper set of metrics and evaluation tests are
developed to evaluate existing PUF architectures against quantum attacks, robustness against
quantum attackers can be verified.
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